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I:t··.·a\h.·ould · be made clear from the start that t,he 
~ \ ' 
,.. ~ 
; analysis and resulting view of knowledge that is put 
I forth ih Cpapte! I does not p.retend to be exhaustive of 
all that can._· proper·ly be called knowledge. Nevertheless., 
I '.think the kind of -·knowledge that is c·onsider~d is an 
extremely ·irnportant kind, lt is that which looms largest 
i.n the study of mathematics, se-i:en-e-e-·, anti philosophy. 
·Briefly put, it: is the kind of knowledge. for. which (when 
. ..,, __ 
de~anded) subst_a;nt:lating. re:a:son:s ·can bt:? gi\re-n. Clearly, 
".._-,, ;'"; ' ' 
. . 
. "4"'< ,; 
· .. 
the generality of this co·nd,i_t-ion- i.~:-- su.-c·h- t:·hat· 1i_t does 
include a very large part (if no.t all) .o_f Wha.t can 
appropriately be ealled ~owledge. I :~rµs,p·ect that if 
there be other kinds of knowledge than. ·t_.hat which will 
.be considered here, it will more properly fall into the 
\ I 
domain of the psychologist and sociologist rather than 
. ' 
. 
.. . ,, . ~' . ., 
that of~ the _:ph_ilosopher. In any ev ..ent th·e poss:ibility 
... 
of this 1~-in:d o.f :-kll_owledge has _rib~t :been preclud:eci. 
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·ABSTRACT 
Start~ng with a rather straightfo~ard account of what 
1·s:: involv~d in ·substantiating· a ·1m~wledge ·cl-aim i~- is· found 
·that t·wo p.~inciples are essential and unavoidable: -(1) the. 
giving of reasons in support of the clatm, and.(2) the 
. 
dependency of these reasons upon- c:ertai·n primary statements 
w_h:Lc:h c·a.n-no.t themselves: be j:ustified .. : Condition (.2) . 
·c::on.st.it,ut.e.·s a cognitive b .. a_.se Wh,ich determines a frame of 
Mo:re.o·ve·r _it:?· i·:s. shown (wi:th one minor ~xceptioh 
. ' 
-
wh.ich in- ·n·o ·:way af·:rect.s the main re·su·lts) that tJ1:er.e .i$· no 
. o·bjectiv.e way of -ch.·oosing one frame of reference ove·r an·d 
ab-cYv:e· ano·ther -and t:ha·t .therefore, a pers-on. su.bscribing t:o 
orie frame of refer·ence- pa.s no ba._s-.is to. a.S.$·ert the meaning;.. 
l:e.-s·sness or fals.ity of :another- f:rAme--~ , He may, howe·ve·r 
g._S se.rt, _.and indeed. s:h,ow, that th·e· ot:he:r :f·rame i-s: i.·r·r¢le:_va-:r1t 
0
= and c-oncern:s ·are w:hat: do., either e~plici tly or :i.mpli·cttly., ' 
r ,_de,termir:ie and de·1 in.eat··e w·ha·t the cogniti.ye ·base· wi.ll b·.e. 
· ,A·ll of this serv-ing to.: ·e:stablish the c:entral thes·is· o.f t,h·~: 
\, ) 
e:·ss.ential relativ·i·ty· of knowledge. 
... 
A _-c_o.t.olt·a.:ry tJ)~ti is: :t.·n;·at_ we rnus:·t:. :aiso hav.e a· :@l.ura.listic· 
. ·i .. 
:o:nt··o.-1:ogy·. Th~.t 1$ i;:o s:Ei.y that .jus:-t _ci·s.· t:h.e· b.e:l:"i~f .t_ha-t there 
. 
-, . ·.-
co.u.ld be. jus·t _:one t_ruth is s·hatt-ered :b)' ~fr-he e1,.-sential 
relat·ivity of kpo,~1-edge, so t.bG- t.he belie·f in~·a fixed set 
,t 
o·f .·fundamental entit.ie.s of· wJ1_ich the "}10:.r:i.ct.·" .:Lsl composed 
. ,,, 
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must· als:o_ ·be ~bandoned.· 
" 
· I:t ,is a·lso shown that the central thes:.is ·al'so appli.es · 
__ to· the analysis from ,~hich it ·was o·btained, but the 
situation is such that-/rather than being a seve .. re .. lim-it.a,t··t·on. 
and involving us in 'paradoxes such as: if .it :i,s true:,, it ls ' , 
~· . 
.In Chq.pter II a..i.fferences b~tween ·th·e not-ion·· of .kIJ.owl:~ 
·,· 
·c:hapter I ana·" that of knowledg·e .~ts: :rela t,lve· :to :cf_ lin.guistic 
:fr.~m.ew.or·k ,~t.s purposed by Rudolpn,· _Carnap ar:e ·discussed, and:, 
-it i·s: s·h·o\1n tnat. ca.map's .P.-os:L:ti.·On··is inappropriate for· 
·.Hen.:c.=e •· ·.• ..... . 
(~. 
... 
:hi..:s ·p.os1·t.=.io·n. i·s .r:_e,je .. cted. 
F,in·:~lly th:e' pos:i.tJq1)- t:·ha.t. '':b.rute ::Ca_qt .. s'' 'ltla.jt s.e:-.rv.e.. :as 
a. f·i_x.e·d and inco·rrig;il;:>le- foundat·io_n -for· Wowl:~d$e · ·i.·s 
~·. 'MJ: ;.. 
,c:o-nsidered and refuted; th·ereby. r·einfor"C~ing the eent_ra.l ··· 
,•. tl.iesis- of the essenti.al relattv·J:·t:y of· knowledge • 
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CHAPTER I 
• 
~: 
The Essential Relativity :t):f Krlowl-edge· 
J 
Suppose A ·(an individualJ as$ert~ the proposition P · 
and B does not-· l;> .. eiieve P a_nd s.o · a·sk·s: why? Now if A is a 
rea(sonable individual he wi.11. ·t:e:.11 :)3 that P is so· s in.ce 
a1 , a2 , •. : __ ,an are so, and clear1y·P,is substa_nti.ated by 
a .. 1 ,-•.• ,an·· Now B may.understand the derivation from 
, 
·•. a1 , .... , an and agree .tha t it is one, but-· h~ .m.ay thir:ik that: 
' . i , .... j 
;•. 
some a 1 i.s. fal.s:e.,_: s·o B questi:on_s: A. as. to. the ·v.al:idi ty or 
"'I! 
truth of __ :a_1 .. A in answer to B:'s in::quJ.:r'ies maike:s a similar 
.-
mov:e a-,s before, viz., he claims that a. i.s· ::s·c) ·s-ince it , ·ir 1 
follows from a', ... ,a'. 1, m No~ ·B may accept this last justi~ 
., fic.atlon (provided it ls v~lid and he takes a{, ... ,a~, to 
.b·e. ·t.:rue) and so A will have establi:shed P; on the other 
hand, B may call into question some aj and A will be forced 
'<' 
to justify a.5 as before, but. eventually this process must 
-~ 
come· to an end; i:f n·ot becaus·e B· --is. sa.ti$_fi:eci, then it wil.1. ; 
i. 
cease for practica,l · reas·ons. In the f.ir:st :c·Et:se· A- a·nd, B 
w·i.11 .a.gree upon a set of stater,ients ($~Y ·~:::£., _ ....•. ,,.a~) w~--ic·h 
. ".· .. .· ijpth of them take. for granted or feel to be incapable· 6f 
• justification,. but acceptable,. or· :they ·will agree that thi-s. 
-·· - .. ---·-··---·~·---- ·--· -• - ---
basic· s·et. of statements is "self-evidently true". I shall 
'I( 
:not be conce·rned wi.th the case where A can never satisfy B . 
.. Th.e case a.t hand is typical of any knowledge claim. 
:.I:n --r.ational ·di·scourse any statement which is questioned 
:, ... 
. ·~. -
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• ·I; 
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. . 
must be j~stified by· reasons, althou~h the· justification 
is not usually as rigorous ~s has been indicated; neverthe-
1ess, the rigorous justification outlibed is the model to 
wh,ich any rational explanati.:on aspires. In any event, one 
of. the c:rucial ·· features upon which my disc~ss:ion_ wil_l· be 
based· is not the apparent deductive nature of the above 
process~ but rather the very es~ential feature of th~ 
;., .... , 
giving of reasons in .support of a knowledge claim. {The 
.giving of reasons is not always a deduction, although it 
is sometimes. ) Moreover if a statement is indeed ever td_ 
be justified we must in ·the -end come to an agreement about 
-~ ~et df .statements or prtriciples for which ~e require no~ 
further justification. If w.e ''turn" th_e· j'l.lstific~t.ion .. 
process "a:roundl' we may sa.y that in &ny· rational inquiry 
we must a.-lwa:y,s "start some,p,l,~c;".e. tr· Tha.t isA· to say, if we 
are to be tt:b:l_e· to :rna.ke. ansr c:ogr.ri:tl,v-e· .advanc'es we must agree 
,. 
upon the t-ru·th or ,~tc·cep,_tabi_lit:y :of some set of statements 
Wi'thout attempting to jus-t.if:.y t:hem, or at le:&s:t we must be 
~ 
'in agreement over the proper met,hod,(s) for· '.our c:ognitive 
endeavors ( whether· we can arrive at' kno\•tled.ge assuming 
only ,a method or methods may or µi.ay no __ t, be the ca._se; ( 
ob.v,iou,sly if we could,, this is to be desired:. J , 
The preceding is simply a·· statement of. the minimal 
-Conditions~ which must be met if we .are ~o have (rational) 
knowle.dge. · That thi·s. is so will b,e made clear in the 
course of thi,s chapt~r, i.f it is not already. "Knowled-,gei,'' 
,,..,,, 
I 
:, 
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· for which there is n·o justifica.tion' ·is_ simp.J.~y not kno.wl-
I 
.. 
edge. The above conditions themseives are. neither.new nor 
,1 . 
!( 
~ 
profound; ne·vertheless the· ramifications are great and the 
_ c.onsequenc~s are deep. We begin to see just why when we 
ask the que.stioni How do we determine which niethod(s) 
and/or set of basic statements to a~cept when there are, 
as always, several to ch9ose from? Similarly if we have: 
a method or set of basi.c statements of· our own, how doc:we 
. 'r, -
· establish the priority or superiotity of ours bver ·other· 
' cognitive bases? Stn·c.e we are at the f'ground floor", we 
? 
--
can not and should not try to justify our basic method(s) 
-and statements, for:,: :as. we have seen., justification of the 
j\fs.tification c.-oul-d 'liegitimately be required and so on 
ad. .. infini t·um.:-· W:hat t·h·en is left to us? It certa.inly is 
't,ne -cas·e. that rational knowledge of -these ::basic sta.tements 
and method( s) (!lence forward colJec.t:L-ve,l·y. :kno-wn as first,. 
'. 
or primary, or fundamental pr·i.nciples.) is precluded., -fo-r· 
.,,_ 
-to know -- something; r:ationally means to· be able to g.iye 
I 
-
valid reasons substalltiating one 1 s cl·aim. 
In speaking ,of "rational knowledge" I do hibt intend-
. .,-. 
t.o: contrast it w-it-h, o.;r _ pre.elude "empirical -knowledge." 
.B:y: "rational know-ledge" I mean· knowl_edge for which good: 
·Or· sufficien·t :re·asons may be given. We give reasons for 
iour empiric·al. knowledge claims, too. Any knowledge . claim 
that cannot be substantiated is not knowledge. However, 
one might now want to :say we can have knowledge of 
-~ . ;..·· ""' .. '1 
. " 
- ,t 
~ 
' 
.. ,. 
.. 
·? . 
. , 
. ' 
.1! 
'I 
I 
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. 
·i·solated emp,irical facts 
·-- "brute.facts" -- ·for which no 
reasons are required. I·· will show in chapter III that this 
:i .. s ... a fiction. 
"".· I'. '· But'. now one might propose what __ s.eems to be a -solution ·--
to our dilemma. He grants all that we have s .. aid, but 
' proposes that ws·can determine our first principles by some 
C extrasystema.tic or auxiliary considerations ..... A laudable 
proposa-~~~;. o·ne w:bic:h we do indeed follow and one which we 
should ,f'c>ll.ow •.. :The r:easons for.~ this will be made clearer • • • .• ·---·· •. i· •• .•• 
later. How·ever.,: .-a. :problem is lurking. What shal.l we do. 
when two indi·v:t-dti:-als propose .an·d insi.f?r~ up·on·. the relevance 
of 'strongly· c:onfl·ic·.:tin.g ext-rasystematic ·:considerations? 
The problem i..s analo·g:ous to. that of justi:fying our first 
principle·$, ·and: a.11 that has been accomJlli·s.:h.ed_ ·-is a p·ofit:·-
ponement of the difficul ti.es. A:.re. we now to: .cons·ider ext:ra~. f p' 
/''./ ~ 
extrasystematic considerations? Sure:L,y the .l·atter ·1s to be r rejected for it is evident where such a move shall lead µs. 
·But then, must our primary princ·ipl.es remain .forever elusi:ve. 
and arbitrary .with no rational :j·u .. stification ( in the s·~rrse .. ~ 
,. 
• I d·escribed ~bov~) for one s:e,t o.v~r and_ above another? T.he 
·answer is a disappointin·g y'e:s. We can never achieve 
rational justificatio;n fo·r a set of fti·ndamental principles; 
··; , 
· nor will extrasystematic cohsiderat-i-otrs.· h~-.l..P· us· any, as we 
have already- seen. · However we need .not· t>e. p·lunged into 
-total despair, for our choice need .rt6t be totally arbitraiy 
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. ( and indeed never ·is)., For a particul~r suoject matt~r a 
,) 
certain . cognitive base will render that subject matter more 
. 
' coherent and more comprehensible than-another. Furthermore 
the event~ characteri~tic of that subject matter will be 
better explained by means of some particular set of funda~ 
mental principles rather than another • ."':.-
We must take note, however, of an important consequence 
·_,o.f =·hhe selection j:ust alluded to. Whatever principles we 
choose, we will ·thereby imnie·aiately exclude the possibt::L:i;ty· 
. 
. :that certain class_es of questions and. :.-s.tatements shoµJ .. :d 
._a-r.:i .. se·. (In re.lativi.ty physics, one simply does not speak of 
:ab'$o.lute · space an.d t·i'me, and so question·s· presupposing or 
;tn·volv·ing s~uch notion;-s are ruled out. ) Once our co_gni tive 
:.bas .. e (.r·unaamenta.l prin·¢ipJ~es) is se:t·. and we comm.it ours.elves 
to. :it, we have r·ocu$·e-d .. our attention i:n such a way. that only 
.cert8:in (kind$ of)' entities wi~l b.e ::pe·rmitted ·either by fiat, 
t.-.e .• , by the fundamental p.rlnc.iple-s, or derivatively from . .• 
,our basis. Fli'rt~~rmore the method(_s) chosen ·w1·11 res.:tr.ict 
, 
our attention to particular kinds of relatio~s which obtain 
, 
between our-entities, and view others as being irrelevant 
. . ': - •: _; ~ .. 
or meaningless~ In addition,. it is ~,9t difficult to see 
that what is meaningless or irrelevant. with respect to one 
set of~primary Principles,· need not be so under a n~w basis. 
Now the crucial obstacle to establishing one set of 
...... ' 
. . fundamental principles rather than another. was otir ipability 
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to justify thos_e principles .. ·. At first bl·ush· it seemed tha~ 
'. extrasystematic.' consider~tions might have overcome this_ 
.... 
' obstacle, but it was subsequently $een that they.were in-
. . 
adequate to the task. What then shall we make. of my clai-
'· 
that given a .specific subject matter, a certain cogni tiv·e 
:4 . base will render that subject matter· more coherent and 
,'• 
comprehensible·? Are not the criteria of coherence and 
· comprehe~1sibil~ ty just disguised extrasystematic .. consider:-· 
' , 
at ions, and ·therefore just as inadequate to disso:l ve :'t:he,. 
problem at hand as any other such consideration? Not quite. 
The generality of these requirements, I think, makes them 
immune to this type of critic ism. ·T.be s.at.lsfaction of 
these crit.e'ria is· what our cogniti_ve end·e·a.v-ors are about; 
' t.hey in no way prejudge our re~ults except by precluding 
" 
t·:he irrelevant, viz. that which lacks :c.oherence and comp re~ 
\. · .... , ... 
bensibil_ity. I make no claim that ·thes:e criteria are 
. exha-u.s-tlve. Thus it migh_t o·btain t.hat a system less 
coherent. ·than another was better·:, and then it would .be clear 
that anoth~t~ ~ore important-~riterion was satisfied. We 
would then have to add this s·tandard t.o: our list, and assign 
relative -weights to. t.he criteria. I think, howev·er, for the 
~- . 
" 
time being these tW6 crite~ia are legitimately. applie·d and 
' . 
- .. --- .. ~ ... . •.. --: .. -
. .. ·-- - ~. , .... ·:·;_·- ... -,:~t, .,. -··- .- . ..... . ···- ~ ... .... ... ·-~· •. ~ .. ·---· ..... ··-· 
will not lead·· us a.stray. 
. Once .a basis is set, it is nOt1 of course, necessary 
' 
tpat come what may we will never c~gj it. If contra-
. 
,,,.. dictions arise we very probably will,· and most certainly 
' "\ 
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ought to, ~o b~ck and reconsid~r what we have taken for 
granted, viz. our fundamental pri~qiples; as a result we 
. . . .., 
may chaos~ to alter· or teject some or all of them. 
' ,· ... 
case..,. __ in point is that of the occur·rence · of the paradoxes 
~ 
' 
.... 
o.f· :s-et theory. To resolve ·the_.:_problems some chose a 
:d..i:fferent onto=logy (e.g., in NBG theory, sets are ·~estrict~d. 
~ ' 
·t·o t:hose c).a.:Sq.e,p- ·w,hich are elements of classes, some classes 
,o;. 
n:·ot :be=-t-n.g.-.s·e-ts).; ~·at:hers attempted a change in method (e.g., 
·Russell wi t:h hi .. s- theo.ry of types). .Note further now these 
examples il.lustrate .. tne· l;{b·ove remark to ·th¢ ~-ffect that .ou:r, 
fundamental princ ipl.e.·s; · determine what e·nt:i.ti:e·s :o:r r.e.latior1s 
will be permitted or be relevant. N··o.twl.th.stand·i.n·g this 
:pos·sibility of~alterations tn tbe basis, it still, of course, 
remains tru.e that a partictil-.ar basis d.ae_s indeed preclude 
·' 
same ~class:es o.f .entiti_e$ ·a.nd relations ,·_f:.rom ever being 
-
cons i d_e. :r¢.d • 
IqeaJ.,:l_y,: , it se·em·s., we would. li·ke to: ·have primary 
p:r,t=n.c_i:p·les we:Lch a:re: tn·disp.ut·.ab·le.. Although there may be 
.. . 
. . 
. . . 
s:.4/c.h p~i::rre.ip.if3s we a:re, unf:ort-unat·e:ly , __ totally incapable 
' . ; . 
<i 
(:the.:o.retic.al-ly or othe:rwl·se,): o.f ever knowing them. ..Mor.e 
,.\· 
.. .. ~ 
precisely, the-· principl·es w·h:ich -we take to be our bas=.is 
--- -- - .. '""f.;oci:- ·-- -
_may, happily, be just ·t·hq.s·e ·Which are the princ·iple·s 
( assuming th/:3.t there are ·su.c.b things), but we could never 
. . 
know that they were the· ones. We may have preferences. for ),,\. ... 
a particular set of fundamental principles, but we ·can 
:n:e_ver know that. they are indeed valid ln t·he · s:en.se alluded to.:. 
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We have thus. seen that the quest for certainty is 
. . 
antecedent.ly doomed to fa.ilure and that this fate may be 
' ,' ,·: ~·i:- . ' 
,, 
. . 
.realized 4pon an analysis of .what it is to have rational 
' I ' • ' 
knowledge; furthermore, as philosophers ·'nothing but rational 
~ . ) . 
knowledge. is acceptable. 
- I"' 
Let us say. t·hat a particular. s.et of first principl·es 
.. 
.. b.r a cognitive base determines a frame of reference.. Thus 
to sum up, t·he best we may achieve is certainty with resp·ect · 
·to a particular fr11me of reference, and w·hat frame of 
reference we cho.ose i.s t.o. a large extent .arb i,trary. The only 
objective test f~~ the sµperior~ty or p~·iority of one frame 
of reference over a .. n.othe.r (p·re·:s-tn~i:trig· tl}ey· a.r.e· both con-
sistent) is that. of theor:et:ica..i. ~u·pef.tority·.. .:S'.y t·h.is· I mean 
that one refe.r~·n:c~ 'frc1me· is s.1..tpe·rior to another :Lf by mean:s 
·of it we can more fully unde·rstand and explain the subject 
matter at hand, presuming we are al~eady in a.greement about 
the subject matter at hand. Thus if two· p.~ysical theories 
(:f·:ra1nes _o.f ·reference) are availabl·e. to :explain the·.'(physical) 
.. 
. Jrebavi:Of o:f. gas~·s, then the onEi>,iwh·ic·h: b·etter explains this ·11 
:b:eha·vio.r is· .sup~rior, and t'he inferior on~ may b·e rejected, 
;.,. 
. . 
. ,. :· n.otw.tthstand·ing· t~at both frames of reference ·haye arbitrary 
., 
.. .. . .. " . . .~ 
. .. ··- .. -.·,-· , ___ ·--~- ,_,,._ .... _ - .. - -~· - _,,,. ~ --•,-··-···-··· (t~ th~ se.·ns~e explained)' primary principles. 
I. 
·Thus· starting from a· rathe.r straightforward logic.al 
. . . ' 
• 
·an·a.Iys:is (jf what it is to have. ·"rati.onal knowledge" we_ have 
... ~ ' 
quickly a·rrived at what we may. call the es-sent.ial 'relativity . 
.. i 
,, 
.. 
of r~tional knowledge (hericefo·rward. we shall speak simply. of 
·, 
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"knowledge';'). ·\4hat in essenc·e. thi-s conclusion· means is that 
-,£.£ statement can logically or obj'ectively make any claim to 
.I , 
validity over. all domains. This essential relativity of 
knowledge is probably the most fla.gran·t1y ·ignored pr·inciple 
-in all of philosophy. We repeatedly find a.ssertions whose ff 
:.proponents claim them to be .true not merely over some re-
stricjd domain but over the entire universe of m~aningful , 
-discourse, i.e._, t·hey are ta.ken to ·b.e un·i ve:rsal truths. 
Consider, for example, the logic·al ,p.q.s,i ti vist' s strong 
-criterion fo_r meaningfulness, viz. '''t.o :be meaning_ful is -t·o-
be empirically verifiable. " Thi·s c'riterion is no.t :propp13·ed-
- ' 
. 
·,. 
as a hypothesis_ (a fundamental principle_), .nor> is it ·said ., i 
·to ~pply only wi tnin a certain range of: eJ~J?e·r·i.e:t1ee ( broadly 
understood); rather· it is claimed to ,b-e. universally 
.. 
applicable to any. f:ramework regar_dless ,o_f- the subject 
matter or t:.lie. p.urpose ( s) f9r wni:cb .i.t ·w.as constructed. ·Now· 
it is ,not; t.o be denied t.hat this criterion is extremely 
. . )( . - ' 
va.:iuaol:e r·or' some aspect·s of some cognitive endeavor·s. · 
• But to claim its .val~d.l ty for a.11 frames o-f.·/ ·refe.:r·ence -afi.q 
\ 
a-11 _.asp.ects is qµite .a~:ottie~ mat~er. 
We may ·-now :~sk i,f t.his cri terio.n 
..... _. or if it is. derivative. ,,.( I have' shtm that · l t. inust be· one 
... •• 
t 
'or the other. ) " If it ~is :d-~_r_ivat 1-ve ( in a loose sense) then 
it .:is ·ul.t·imately _re-·ducib.'l.e. t:o some primary -prin.ciple and 
s-O·., · ·f:o-r the purposes of qur discussion, we· may.· consider it 
· ·to. be_; ,a primary principle. But then the difficulties which 
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I 
we discussed earlier which ar~.se ·with _respect to knowing 
that such princip~es do· indeed hold, appl·y here, too. ·Of. 
\ 
course, the positivist will now bring in his extrasystematic 
·''·evidence". What are we to make of.this evidence? 
' 
> 
Surely 
it seems to have great force~ Just how much will be seen 
in our di.scussion of· fact.s ... ( Chapter III). ___ But let us first 
t .. Ur·n our- atten·tiori -t·.o th,e fruits which ·the positivist may. 
:hope to reap grant-$d-., for the time bein_g, t·hat his extra-
systematic ev,i.d·$nc~ ~is compelling. .To :do this we turn ou:r 
. '~ .. . . 
.l .. 
attention, onc_·e ag·ain, to <the ge.ne.r·a1l.·rta·ture of cqgrj_itive, 
endeavo.rs. 
In these en'a.eavors w.e start with a rather vague ide'~ 
9,f what we are concerne--d with, i. e ~:, w.hat aspects of expe·ti_;... 
1r---:,--' 
en:ce { ''expe:rlence-". •. -~is. her:e being used ._in its most general 
s·e,nse·) tha.:t: i_t is, we want 'to know afroti:t. or explain.·~ Then 
-with t-:his .more_. :o:r '.less·. vague. idea as a starting poi·n.t· we-
lt.:. 
• 
.. m~Y-, '·.b:y· s:11cc.e,s:si·ve approximations,· ascertain t:he essent'i,a·1 
·-:fe·atu:res ·o .. f: those a~pect~·, :l;nd ·_hopefully, the essent·ial 
J>"r-:inciples which govern t:·hose aspects; from thes~ we wi:l-_l: 
.. 
·.o:bt:a,in knowledge of the: elements of this p.-articular. '':~-li-c.:e: 
··of· ·the world,"· and the- relations ·wh.i·ch ob .. tain: betwe.:en them_. 
The "essential features of ·tnose·. aspects" pre·viously 
('' ., 
:referred to is what is couched i:n tbe primary principles. 
... . ... ~ . . ..... ; .. . .. ·... ~~ .. , .. ~' 
And this is so whet.he·r we are explicitly or oply implicitly 
~ware of that upon which our attention is focused. This 
procedure is the, one we generally. foll·o.w :oncw we have more 
. ( . 
.. 
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' ~ ~ less decided to focus our attention on some area (broad ·. ---~ . 
~hough it may be) rather than another. The error obtains 
~~ 
. 
. only when after going through this procedure· one seeks to 
c-laim that all aspects of the '!world" which are not in 
p conformity with t·he obtained results are meaningless. This 1
· 
unrest:ricted generalization is a manifestation of the quest 
for certainty and is unforgivable in that this quest pre~ 
I . 
supposes a .. "super"· or transcendent knowledge ( of first 
princ·iples) which i_s theoretically impossible for us to 
obtain as has been shown. I charge the positivists-with 
making this error of unrestricted generalization, and thus :I 
•'• ~· ,;_ ,h......,.. .. • .. ·-::=;..-.0. 
conclude (independently of whether their extrasysteinatic 
.. 
e.vlde·nce is compelling) that tqeir a,se is not established. / 
Now it will be remembered that earlier in this chapter 
I. said that extrasystema.tic considerations were indeed how 
we did ~nd should attempt to estab,lish our first principles., 
.. 
and if it was thought that I was implying that ·they would 
then be established conclusively, or absolutelj, then in 
that cont.e.xt th~ assertion may have, seemed queer, .but we ·a--re 
. now in a ·pos'ition to- see why it was not. I was not then 
_ seeking to show_ tha-t·-·:·en-e could eve-r obt·ain absolute or 
universal knowledge, but was trying to show that such knowl-
edge was impossible. Thus my advocating.the advisability 
.... ( 
' • I of extrasystematic considerat~ons (which a.re themselves 
relative.) was anticipating "the conc·1usi·on that knowledge. is 
essentially relative·. 
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But now the- ·objection may. be ra_ised that al though the 
preceding may indeed be·· the case, it .. ~s not entirely relevant 
for it- constructs knowledge on the mathematical model and we . 
~ .are not confined to this model. But- has this alleged model 
(.'' ., . 
·~· 
. ,· 
actually been presupposed? More importantly, is there any-
.. 
thing in the model described·· ( regardless of whethe·r it ·be a 
mathematical one or not) th·at we would be willing to give up? 
Sur·e:ly if anyone makes a knowledge claim we should mainta.in 
the right to ask for a justification of that claim, and what 
should that. justification be .·but the supplying of "sufficient.:r' 
reasons ·for t.h·.e claim? And if one or some of· t·hose reasons -
. -·' 
, 
are dubi.ous w~ certainly ~re entitled _to ask for· justification 
of the;m· a:lso, ang c·ont.inu~·- in. this fashion until agreement is 
·. 
reached.- 'l1hus, sure.ly, it i:s not- the element of justification 
- .. 
that we are willing to .aban>dt.ln-. Perhaps it ts th.e notion of 
first principles? If we abandon the notion of fir.s-t :prin·ciples;· 
then .. it· seems that ·the ·only· .a.lternatives ar.e:. (1) to have . 
. non-terminating chains of :r:easons (which a.r.e ei.ther· li'n'e·ar or 
cyclic .or a combinati.on- ot: the.se ) or, (2) to cl~im. our ability 
;t·o determine a certai·n· :"ro.ck-.bottom" in ou:r cognitive. endeavors, 
\ ~ 
which w.hen rea~hed, could not. be questi-oned further, and, of 
. . - J 
-
course, which would not be .ar·b~trary .. ·So:, on this view, the 
notion of first principles. is accepted, but· they are considered 
--
. 
to·be absolute . ·'rhe firs~a.lternative, .("l), seems to be, 
patently undesirab_le·; however, if one i.nsis_ts ;upon it, at. thJ.:s. 
stage,· I am unable to offer,.a,ny compellin·g .. reasons for· an 
' 
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'' unequivocal rejection other than pointing ,out that the 
character of explanation, ·1r this mode is accepted, will be 
' 
' 
very much akin to that of ad hoc explanations. I take the 
probability that the second alternative should ever obtain 
to be absolutely zero. Of course, in saying this it is not 
being denied that·within a particular frame of reference 
---------
R • 
. there would be a rock-bottom_ - for a given frame the funda-
mental principles are rock-bt>ttmm; once those are reached 
nothing more can be said within that frame of reference. But 
this is sti11 essentially different from what is being claimed 
, .. 
·in (2), for the fundamental principles of any framework are ,· 
• • I never categorical in the sense that· we can know that they· are. 
,., 
It is in believing that we could ever recognize a categorical· 
principle ~s being one that the \statement in (2) goes hopeles.sly 
astray. Sue~ "rock-bottom" principles. cannot tran~cend a I 
particular frame of reference and still maintain their in-
corrigibility. or their relevance. The ·latter alternative is 
important for although ther~ may· occur cases in which a state-
ment preserves its truth in two disparite frames, it· by no 
means follows that it will be relevant in both. Jfhe facts 
' ... which one attends to· is largely determined by the theories· he 
-
accepts. (This will be amplified in Chapter III.) 
Thus the model is seen to contain two essent-ial features 
. ,, 
-.·--,.>,:· ,, • .. ,.:···: ·- one~-1.10f· which we certainly would never gi:ve up ('the supplying 
of sufficient reasons for,. t~e. knowledge claim), and the other 
{the not,ion of first principles which w~re _shown to be, 
s 
. . ' 
necessarily, arbitrary) being such that the ~lternatives to it·' 
'· . I ,, 
•,' 
. ! 
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are ·not acceptable. Moreover, both· of these are crucial i-n 
r. 
the establishment of any knowledge _claim as knowledge. Hence 
whether the· model is mathematical or not does not seem to be 
very relevant, the important point being that it captures 
the es.sence of what it is to know that P is th.e case. 
I shall now try.to shed further light on the {fallacious) 
claim that first principles need not be arbitrary. One wh·o 
· asserts this probably thinks that there are things which we 
know independently of reas.o·ns, and which are not relative to 
a particular frame of re ..ference. To cite two extremes of 
J, 
this point of view, we· ha.ve empirical fact and mystical · 
·revelation. · To refute .. these claims we may either .attack each 
of our_ examples indivi·dU~lly or simply "throw" them together 
and let them eradic·ate each other. Since it is easiest to 
take the latter course, I shall (although JI _will have more to 
say later {Chapter III) with regards to empirical fact). 
No~ both the mystic and the empiricist claim to be l·n 
.. 
. Po·s .. sess·ion of some fundamental truths and each would deny .. that 
.. • •1 
. 
, • . ' 
' 
the other ~·,does have such a posses·sion. · 'Evidently then either 
•LT 
just one of them posse:S·S t:he truth {this ·involves' absolute 
. \ 
truth, whi-ch the quest for certainty pr~supposes) or in a very 
real sense they both do but they are each dealing with different 
world-~slices o.r they are, approaching the same world slice 
,· ' 
J 
' 
• I 
1:1 Ii 
,] 
r 
I 
,.I 
([ 
11 
II 
I 
-~~: '·----~.~-·-·-----d-1-f·fe-ren tly • Of- -course, I accept the latter· al te~rniti ves 
I • e 
. ' 
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rat~her than the former, and this is don 1e in light:~of the ] '·1 r 
. . 
esse.ntial _relativity of knowledge which I am at pains to ' ·II i ) 
r 
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explicate · herein. l}ut what about the other di·sjunct: that 
. 
. 
. 
· only one of them is i!} possession of the truth. and the other 
is wrong. This can be made tenable only if we allow that 
some have a special facility of' insight. into the "realities 
of the world" while others do not. {Thus, there are absolute 
.. , 
first principles. and some .pe_ople can know th@m. ) Now if we 
were _talking about-particular individuals it is plausible to 
.suppose that some are wiser or more penetrating than others, 
inde~d this often is the case and it is generally not too 
") 
! difficult to discriminate the one from the other. However, 
we are not talking about particular individuals, but large 
·numbers of men throughout the ages all demonstrating a 
:~. 
j peculiar wisdom or insight and consequently, it is not nearly . ' 
a_s pl,ausible to s_uppose this special.facility in one group 
of these individuals as opposed tq ·another, e~g·> to suppose 
\ . 
that the empiricists are right a,nd the mystics wrong, or 
. ~ 
,- ... \, 
conversely. It might be added that we needn't restrict 
·o:ursei ves ,to the aoove examples of contra·rie s, but may find. 
an equally strong op.position of the same type between groups 
of individuals which-are more closely related, e.g., the 
formalist and the intuitionist in mathematics. Thus it seems 
' that· we are hard pressed to find an objective· test which would 
~ s_wing the balance in favor of one of two rival -systems, and - . " I 
. we see once again that we must abandon the belief that some 
could know the absolute first principles ( a:ssum.ing that there 
' 
. 
. are:arty) and with it the belief that Reality· is stngle-faceted. 
' 
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·The for.egoing may be misleading; no claim is .being made 
' . 
:t·o the effect that all there is is opinions or. that every 
statiement is equally plausible. This is definitely not the 
:f case. With-in a given frame the questions of truth and 
1-, 
__ .. ,. - --··-
falsity will.arise and can be answered. What I am trying to 
sho.w is. that our knowledge claims must be weakened consider-
ably. The best we can hope for is the validitf of our state-
ments with respect to a pa.rti.cular frame, and that from within -- ---- -- - ----- ---.(~ 
'--.;;.. 
,,,,, ... - / 
--- .. · 
a given frame some questions may seem meaningless or irrelevant, 
-
but the situation may legitimately be reversed when viewed from ... 
-~ different frame, for there is no absolute frame (or at least, 
~ we can never know one to be absolute). This does not mean-
that those meaningless state·ments are to be forever ignored. 
The meaningful and the meaningless may change cloth~s.as our 
is purposes or interests change. What is meant"that so 1·ong as 
one is -concerned with those aspects of Reality which a particular 
frame of reference was design_ed to deal -W~ - then those state-
ments which are viewed to be meaningless are meaningless -
but if one's interests ·change, then the meaningless may become 
meaningful. Thus logically (i.e., ob.jectively) all frames __ Qf · 
reference are.equivalent in .so f~r as :~ach of them adequately 
and consistently exp·lains the events· which they are designed 
to deal with. Furth~:r,nore, ~ particular frame of reference 
.··1s· inc.apable of making assertions about another,, unless it ·was . . 
specifically designed to do so. But when the latter obtains 
the two frames are not compettng with one another with the 
. ~: .· 
.: I 
. ) ' 
(, 
-
' 
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I 
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I 
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' 
end of excluding the other, for the subject matter of the._ 
. 
two is different. (Roughly speaking the relation .betwee~· 
the .. ;two i~~that of metalangu-age to object language.) Conse-
•. i quantly, one system cannot legitimately ass·ert the ·meaningless_., 
(__ -----~-- .- --
ness' of another. 
' -
The treatment to this point has been rather generaljv how-
·ever,. the ge,nerality is desirable-· in that· we were trying to 
explicate an/!- clarify the most essential features of knowledge 
.-and not what knowledge means in a particular frame <of reference, 
although that has come out, too. In addition, we .,were at· pains 
to show the consequences of those feature~. But now we are in 
a position to make a very interesting observation. In light 
. 
. of t:he -ess.ehtial relativity of knowledge, are w.e to say that 
·our analysis itself is relative to some framework and thus 
ultimately relative to some set of primary principles? The 
answer is yes, but the nature of the case is such ·t·.hat i·n:--
stead of being a Short-coming, it i·s now a virtue. Our 
' 
. 
primary princi.p.les are those appearing in what we called the 
model f-or knowled.ge, .and just _as in any other primary 
principles, the essential .natur·e· of th~ 'object or range of 
experience ( "experience:"· is .once again used in i.ts most 
,_ 
. general sense) of .concern is couched in them. Now our funda-
mental princ-iples will exclude som'e world. s11·ce's, ~ as do all 
., 
first. principl'es. But what wor1-d· sl.ices are excluded? Th·ose 
.,· which are non-epistemological-. ·. That this is so can be seen 
1 , 
.,. 
~ 
. . fr·om·- our earl1.er ·considerations where we saw that _ in so tar 
\ 
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• a·s one is con.cerned _with rati9nal knowledge he must ·admit ou.r 
p~inciples as minimum conditions to be satisfied.- So any 
epistemology that does not inclu<:ie them is not an adequate 
.. 
foundation :for knowledge. Thus we see that it is indeed true 
that our p·rin.c.iples must (inherently) exclude certain areas, but 
'-. precisely those areas are· ex·cluded which are not desi:r:ed." · Hence 
what i~ a disappointing~~~ature in most frames of reference 
turns .. o't1t to be a most desirable one in ours. 
A cons,equence of the above. account for ontology is that we 
must also admit the essential r·e1ati vi ty, .of our entities, too. 
We must say that there are no fixed quie·scent entities, but 
what precisely the "fundamental". enti ti-es are will vary with the 
frame of reference.:, (The latter pronouncement paral.lels Quine' s 
dictum: "to be is to be .t,he value of a bound varia.ble," but on 
an inf·ormal level.) ·Thus·,. the phenomenologist nas a different 
,.ontology than ·that of the logical positivist,. but we cannot 
decide whose e·ntities "really" are, just as w·e cannot decide 
which of the two considered has the true frame of reference~ 
for we have shown t.hat to so decide (i.e., to know which indeed 
is the "real" cm,e) would require that we had some absolute_ 
- -
standards, and although there may be such ;standards ( in .some 
. -
transcendent sense) ·we ca.n never know them. More· preci~sely, 
I 
.... 
give·n a set of· principles, we _can never know that they are such,-~-<· .... 
~Consequently, it is foolish to talk as if we did 9r coul(}-knew- - -· · · 
. them, o;r to entertain quest ions Which p~esuppose such tran..:. · 
· sc-endent knowledge .. 
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, CHAPTER II 
THE NECESSITY.AND SIGNIFICANCE OF INFORM.AL QUESTIONS .. 
The purpose of the present chapt_er is two-f·old: first, 
. to distinguish clearly the essential and significant difference 
between} the notion ·of framework and knowledge relative to i.t 
as presented in Chapter I froin the analogous notions in 
,, . 
. 1 ' :Carnap's "Empiricism, Semantics, ·and Ontology" (ESO) ; secondly, 
' 
to show that Carnap·' s usage and analysis of these terms is in-
appropriate and inadequate for philosophy· .and in particul·a·.t 
·for.ontology. 
"' It is realized that"- car.pap ·1 s, a,naly·s.i·s· .. wa:s: undertaken 
precis·eiy for the purpose of elimln~:t_in_g onto:logical questions-
-in what he might call the philosop:hfqal :S~·nse .. · I sl:lal~l ar:gue,_,, 
however, that ·"philos.ophical ontology" doe-s. tiot _gtv~. :r,is·.e. to 
.; . pseudo-question.s., ·and t.hat philosophical. on.tol-crgy (more 
. . 
./. . . . e· gen~ra:11.y:, :P=h'.flo.s.oppic~:l end,eavors other t.han the Carnapian 
-:l'.~rand) can ·b.e:· executed in a <meaningful way. ., .Indeed what Carnap 
has call·ed ps_eudo-questl.o~s become genuine and (sometimes) 
r meaningful questi~ns_when the qichotomy between external and 
internal· questions is appropriately understood. We shall s·ee 
-, that his understanding is inappropriate¢.for p~ilos .. ophy. .-- ...... ' •· . ~ j ... ~ 
I can agree with Carnap when he says·· in his conclusion 
.... t-hat, 
JI . 
!Reprinted in· the Philosophy of Mathematics, P. Bernacerraf 
'<I'' 
and H. ·Putnam, editors. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:. Prentice-,.,. Ha.11, Inc. , -1964. 
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"Fbr those who want to develop or use f. 
semantical methods, the decisive question 
is not the alleged ontological ~uestion of 
the existence of abptract entities but 
rather the questiqn whether the use of 
abs-tract lihguisti:c .forms or, iri technical 
te.rms, the use of· ·variables beyond those for 
things ( or phenomenal data) , is expe_ d ien t 
and fruitful for the purpos~s for which 
semantica1·analyses are made, viz. the 
analysis, interptfe·t,~tt·to-i1:·; clarification or 
construction of languages o·r communicat_ion 
especially l~nguages of science. 11 2 ·· 
w·i-tch all of this ·I agree, especially since he qualifies what 
he· says wi t·h the phrase "for those who want . to develop or use 
semantical methodsu, but semantics is not philosophy and the 
• 
ontological question. is not a linguistic one. Carnap's 
. entire pape1: presupposes ( among other things) the thesis that: 
. 
the nature of philosophy %s or ough't to b·e formal, and that· 
<,..._. 
) 
se.mantics is ·th.e proper formal tool._. We shall see t.hat 
:_p_li.f.los ophy is :Q:ot and ought not t.-o t,e· :formal. 
I propose to show that· t'.he applica.tion of t·his thesis 
evades c~n;~~T and im:ortant philosophical issues, and the 
latter are by· .·no means -mean.ingle::s_s. Meaningful questions 
l 
can be raised in ·regards ·to the existence of entities them-
selves.,· independently· of t,helr being "e.lements of the system," 
-·· .. 
i.e.,. in what .he calls t·he external sense .. What I.mean by 
\ , 
.':.':inde_pendently" in the ·above is not that the )~ntities, if . 
'~ 
·they are real, can. be known ·"in ~hems_elve.s" (Dinge an sich) i. · 
indeed, I have at least·suggested in Chapter I hbw such 
2
~bid., p. 247. 
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•' 
. / knowledge would be .impossiWle. What is meant is that the 
question can be meaningfully rai~ed independently of a 
framework as Carnap understands them. What can:iap calls 
the external _question, we shall see, can very\ often be 
. meaningfully asked (~nd indeed is). Just why thes·e questions \. . / 
are, at le.ast sometimes, meaningful Will be made clear when 
we speak of "informal questions.''· 
... 
. ' 
Now for Carnap to say that an entity ·is, is t-:o say' 
-
.. that it is an element of a system; the question as to the, . ~ 
, 'I existence of a·n entity is. meaningful onl_y in so far as it is 
internal. When we ask the external question we are asking 
,· lJ a practical question which we put forth as-.if it were 
theoretical. In a sense this is correct; just in what 
sense, we shall se~ later. We first propose an alternative. 
: 
' Following Myhill I und~rstand a question to be an 
expression of an intellectual anxiety.·~ I take the liberty . ' 
of quot:l_ng him li·berally on this, since I could do no . better~ 
A question is an expression of intellectual anxiety and an answer-is· an attempt at resolution of that anxiet,y-. I distinguish formal from _informal questions, and within the latter I distinguish subjective and objective.· 
. A formal question carries with it the form of its.answer, that is, the social context is such that the criterion of acceptability for the answer is. known and r agreed upon by both questione; and answerer in abstraction from the answef' itself. The purest kind of formal question is the question of the truth or falsity of a . mat,hematical theorem witti'in a known system-. For the criteria of being a proof or not being.a proof within that system are 
f 
.. . .. ·-~· 
" . ' . / 
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" capable of .exact specification and are in the ideal case specifically agreed · upon by questioner and answerer. Questions in the empirical sciences are a less pure kind of formal question,. since the criteria of conf-irmation are less exactly specifiable than those of mathematical proof. 
An informal '"question is one the form of whose answer is not known either by quest.ioner or answerer in abstraction from the answer itself. The dictum that the meaning of a proposition is the mettled \Of· its verification does not apply to propositions which answer inform.al questions, for part of the meaning of such a question 
, is to question what the form of its answer would be. Thus part of the meaning of the question "how shall I face the prospect of my dea.th?" is ~'What form of answer (psycho-l analytic, t~eological, semantical) would resolve the anxiety expressed by the question 'How shall I face the prospect of my d'ea th'?" More simply, if and in proportion as a question is formal, the questioner is prepare~ to state precisely what kind of evidence would conyince hilJl 
· of the truth of any proposed answer. A formal question asks for the matter of its answer but provides the form; an informal question asks for both.3 · 
· 
.. 
(I s-hall later take up Myhill' s distinctions of sub-
jective and objec.tive questions within informal questions.). 
• 
••• Now my contention is that Carnap uses ·"internal" and 
"external" as Myhill uses "formal" and "informa.l" respectively·. 
It is clear that Carnap's "external" and Myhill's "informal" 
correspond very closely if not identically, and although 
. I 
3John R. Myhi1·1, 1ton the Ontological Significance of the Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem", pp. 58-59, in Ani~rican Phi~osophical · :Association Eastern Division. Vol. 2: Academic Freedom, Rel.igion,. and Logic, edited by Morton White.,-· Philadelphia, 
· Pennsyl·vania: University o.£ Pennsylvania Press, 1963. 
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Carnap does- ·not explicitly set down as a criterion that an 
.. 
internal question must supply the form (in Myhill's sense) 
of 1 ts answe.r, I maintain that it is st_rongly implicit in 
wJ1at . he says__.,. 
That this i.s. t_he· -cra,se :-c-ome.~- out. in the f:oll:owing 
passage: 
The linguistic forms of the framework of 
numbers, including variables afld the g.eneral term "number" are generally used 
.in our common language of communica.tion; 
and it is easy to formulate explicit rules, for their use. Thus the logical character-istics of this framework are sufficiently 
clear [i.e., the characteristics which 
especially pertain to formal questions are 
clear] ... In spite of this [i.e., the 
adequacy for answering formal questions J, 
~he controversy concerning the external [ informa-1] question of the ontological .. -
reality of the system of n~bers continuea.n4 ~ 
: ... 
f '!.n b·:rief then, Carnap is saying~ that in spite o:f the :fact: that 
we :·have adeqµate machinery for answering intern:~.1 ·que,st·ion-s,~ 
the:re i·s stil_l controversy with regards to ext·erna.l. qu.e:·s·t:iot1.s:. 
, lie: th~:p. ci-.tes what two opponents _in such a :co_nt.roversy ·mi.gnt 
:$·ay· :to one another a.nd then tells us- that, 
'.) 
"I ca:anot think of any possible evidence \ 
'that would be regarded as relevant by both 
:philosophers, and therefore, if actually· 
\foutid, would decide the controversy or at least make one of the opposite thes~s more probable than the other ... Therefore I feel 
compelled to regard the external question 
as ct pseudo-question, until bo~h parties 
' 
.fr to the controversy offer a common '_.Din_ter-pr~ta tion· of the question as a cognitive question;-this would involve an indicatidn ..... - .. 
. ' 
4 ca.rnap, ·p· .. 245. 
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of pos-sible evidence regarded as relevant by both sides."5 · 
¥ ff 
,; 
• Clearly what Carnap is asking when he requests a "common 
interp!etation of the question as a cogni t·i ve ~uestion" 
.. ~,,. . . {hence for him, internal) is that the exte:rnal .que.st'ion "'be. 
--transformed into an internal one, and unless. and until st1c.h 
. 
a transformation is obtai·ned the quest~on is for Carnap, of 
cours.e.,_ __ meaningless .. a~n;c.·e he refuses to consider ,any .,;( 
, 
question which· does not by i·ts. nature reveal the form which 
the answer to it: 'mus,:t take .. 
Now it is :c·ertai-:ply open to Carnap to refuse to consider 
-·qµ¢Js.·t.ions· o.f tn.1:s s:,c,rt· (i.e., informal questions), but that 
he so refu.s'e$ t.s- nett :t-·o s:a.y that they. are mea.ni less. For 
him to say ·the lat.ter is not merely to say that he as an 
.,. 
-~~":\ . individual is not concerned with such questions~ but rather 
~. that no one ought to be concerped wit:h tr:iem, at least in s:9 
f.ar as they are concerned wi:fh cognitive studies. The 1-atter 
assertion is a far cry diff~rent ·from the former and i:s in 
need of an :itldependent :de:.fense, whereas the former;, is l·rj.:, 
no need of such a de.f:erts,e. (indeed it is in .. need of nd:: -.d¢f:en\s.e 
at all). 
In additio.n ·we point out that Carnap's asking for the 
. 
. kind of evidence which would.settle the matter satisfies 
precisely the· f9ll'owing condition: "If and in pro.por·tion as 
~·5Ibid., pp. 245-.246. 
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-a question is formal~ the questioner is prepared to state 
precisely what kind of evidence would convince him of the 
. 
. ' 6 truth of any proposed answer." Thus the foregoing 
oustif~es our assertion-of the identify of the terms 
"external" and "internal" with the corresponding ones of 
Myhill's. 
It ·- the acceptance of only formal ·questions as being· - - . - . --- - .... 1-S . .. · 
meaningful--ey·carnap that gives rise to the allegation that 
his understanding of the nature of the dichotomy between 
external and internal is entirely inadequate for philosophy~ 
f•, ~ 
As we shall see ( a l'a Myhi.11) this is so because when ! 
question becomes formal it ceases to be philosophical, and 
that is not to say that it becomes meaningful whereas prior 
to its transformation it was meaningless; for in so far as 
th:e. q'tj.e·$tion wa,.s an expression of a. g:enuin.e, ·intellectu·a-:i 
'· 
·anxie<ty ,(-and- _p;re·sumably all seri:ous- -quest:ions are) it was 
. ' 
;, 
a genuine que·~-tion. And._ b:y ,a- ''genuine question" I mer_e1y · 
mean one that. is worthy of consideration·-- one that cannot 
. 
be ru1e·d out as meaningless in an a prior-i :f'as-hion. (I 
_;,sh~_ll presently_ elaborate .. on this aspec-t of· questiOI?,s.) 
·• 
... ,.... . . 
·Th~t is, "A question does not have to be precise in order 
"· 
' 
·t.6 express a genuine anxiety·!./ and thus be a genuine question. rr7 
. 
. To further our go~l of showing the inadequacy of 
Carnap's conception ·of·· the meaningful .,for phiiosophy~ --we · ' ' 
6Myhill, .. p. 59· 
7Ibid., p. 59. 
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quote Myh111· on· the distinctioil of the: obfecti ve and stib-' 
jective with.in .informal questi.on·s and also on the ·nature 
of philosophical a~tivity: 
', 
I distinguish within informal questions between objective and subjective, acc·ording 
as there is or is not. agreement as to the 
effectiveness of the answer in resolving the 
anxiety which p~ompted the question. Hence 
there is no way of knowing whether an in-
formal que·stion i~ objective or subjective 
until the question is answered. Even ·1n 
that case, there is usua11-y-- t·h·e -pos-s·ibility-·· .. ---
that a subjectively satisfy·ing answer may later be replaced by an objectively satis-fying ene. Evidently ·the distinction between subjective and objective informal questions is relative, dependent 9n social 
conditions. A question which is informal, but cl·ose to objectivity is "What is the 
meaning of the definite article?" At=, the 
oth-er extreme are questions expressive of 
neurotic anxie~y which can be resolved 
only by special treatment in each case . 
. Philosophical activity is the activity 
of resolving anxiety expressed by objective· informal ques~ions. Because what is at one 
time informal may later become formal, the philosophical area shrinks progressively, ~ yielding place to science. Because few if 
any informal questions are entirely 
objectiv~, there is diversity. of pfl:ilosop:hi~c-al 
systems.~ 
' \ B·efore con~inuin.g I thin~ we must make one minor correction 
·- in the preceding. _ Note that the_ criterion for d'ete·rmining 
whether an informal question is obje~t.ive or not is such 
' ' a,t that w.e cannot say that philosophy is concerned .only with 
these · and not the subjec-ti ve infefmal ones. The -determina:... 
. ' '•· 
· tion of a qu~stion as being objective or subject-ive can 
only be made after it is answered,- i.e., prior to· an answer 0 
8Ibid., p. 59, 
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.·. to an informal question we are not, able to t.ell whether 
it is objective or subjectiv~: -A question is objective 
· b~ly· if its answer demands general assent .. Of course in 
the extreme cases of subje<f i ve questions we probably could. 
tell in advance, and then it would certainly be correct to' 
·say that philosophy was not .concerned with t_he- subjective 
informal questions. But in light of the criterion for 
separatingthe two kinds of informal question, we must say 
that philosophy is concerned with informal questions in 
general ( once the _obvious instan~es of subjecti-ve informal 
questions have been eliminated}. 
' 
:t.: 
-~ 
~ Now if we understand a question t.o be an express ion of ~ f 
,, 
·-an intellectual anxiety we can not, at a stroke, relegate 
.,. the· informal questions to the cogni t·i·ve· darkness of the .. \:'f; ;: ~·:..--·. . 
meaningless. To do so woulcf presuppose that ··we are in a 
position to say of someone else, that while he may have 
thought that he had an intellectual anxiety about certain 
matters, he, in fact, did not~ I take the probability ·of 
the latter situation to obtain to be nil. If an individual 
:is uneasy about a situat·ion, he is uneasy arid cannot. be.· 
ni"istaken about this uneasiness. This is sufficient to claim 
-
the authenticity· of the question, and th~ latter estab.lish~s 
.. the questions right to a fair hearing. Note that this does , -· 
- not imply that ·every quest.ion is meaningful _just beeause it~-
. expresses someone's anxiety; the question may turn out 
• I 
JI . . . . 
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upon analyEfis to be meaningl~ss. Bu·t obse·rve, if this ... 
obtains .then that analysis should then resolve the anxiety;. 
moreover, the meantnglessness h~s.n~t been determined in 
.. 
. an a priori fashion. · Furthermore, the anxiety was still--
real (and so the question ·expressing it was genuine); the 
analysis. served to show that the anx·iety was misguided. 
"" Thus not all genuine· queitions- need be meaningful, but 
' . we cannot .know in _?,dyance which genuine que~tions are indeed 
meaningful and which are not. Obtaining knowledge is a very 
' difficult process and it generally cannot be achieved with-
1 out t i h ex ens ve researc . The determination of whic_h areas 
are worthy of research is, at least, e_qua-.:.tly :difficult;· 
~ often we s-imply do n~t know until we try. To preclude some 
of th.ese ·attempt~ in advance on the basis of some dogma is 
.n.o.t conducive to the growth of knowledge.· Of' course in 
a,.ctu:al practice a particular individual does not, cannot, 
. 
~ 
·artd :.should not try to rese_arch all areas on the basis that 
t:hey may turn out to be worthy. But this limitation is 
qui.te different than the limitation. imposed by :some _.ge·nera-1 
principle (which i tse1·r could be called into que-stion) 
e.g., that ~nformal questions are meaningless. 
The grounds. 1·ndicated (note:. I have not said what is 
·to be meaningful an·d what is· not) in the preceding paragraph_ 
for asserting the meantngl·essness of questions differs . 
' radically from the grounds which Carnap invokes .. ·The lat.te.r 
·~ 
stipulates the meaninglessne·ss of a very broad class of .. 
_..::;.; ·'·---· 
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~tatements at a stroke by a priori means. The formE.fr takes 
a more liberal. and rational view as to what is to count as 
meaningful~ Thus while Carnap ~nd Myhill,both agree as to~ 
where the l.ine is· to .be drawn, they evaluate whp.t falls 
under informal questions differently. Car11ap wants to 
~ -abolish the latter as meaningless and Myhill tells us that .. . 
-- _I 
.. 
-· 
it- is a ~ubclass (although we do not know in advance ·whi~ch . . 
. 
. 
subclass) of these which is the bread an=d butter of. the 
' "' philosophers~ In addition, Carnap gives no reasons why we 
- . 
should not be interested in these questions at.her than th~t 
they are metaphysical. Of course, he would have us believe·· 
that since they are metaphysical they are also meaningless. 
The justification for this latter infere~ce is that they 
ar,e. extern·a1 .and so he claims, cannot be answered. But the 
.qu·estic;,n ·then is whether "ex·ternali ty" or·" informality" is:'. 
a -suf.fici,ent: .reason for meaninglessne-.ss, i.e., whether :·hi.s 
f·i·at is u.ni-ver.s·ally valid. (For certainly sometime·s, it · 
ls v~l-i·d: whe·.rt one is working within a framework.) Carnap 
-
does not ·answe~r this question. 
On the other hand, one might ask what grounds are there 
. . 'I' for claiming that· inforinal que$tions-are sometimes meaningful. . . 
I 
' ' 1' Hasn '_t it simply been asserted that they are expressions of 
·an intellectual anxiety and so are sometimes 
::._.Thus, the ·1ogi·c qf the two·cases is quite simil.ar. Isn't i·t 
· the case that two d·ifferent frameworks are being proposed, 
and isn't l t .;ra.ther perverse for me now to claim that Myhill .. 
' ~....... . -:- . 
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.. --,, is -right and Carnap wrong ·ror iri doing ·so· am I not.commit-ting 
-
. the fallacy of unrestricted generaliza~ion·? And is it not · 
......... ... just. this fal,;tacy for which I am taking Carnap to task? • r 
/. 
The answer to all of these questions, at this stage, is yes. 
But I shall soon produce evidence that· there are meaningful 
·. 
informal questions; moreover, ·that some of these question.s-
. ' 
are of extreme import·ance. In fact, I shall produce an 
eJ~plicit-example of a case where informal questions of 
. tremendous import were raised. . Bu-t before doing this let 
~.="--.-,, --------- --- ----
us get clearer on the exact nature ·of the controversy between 
·. Myhill and Carn~p. The dilemma which a/rises by the juxta-
position of tne two approaches yields an opportunity to 
apply what has already been le.arned about the na tu.re o·f:· 
frameworks. 
F·irst of ·a-11, ·ha·r_q'.:ty any:one .. ·woul.-cl ·q-ue:·stion that much of 
Carnap's work: ts -to establish the: me~ni·ngles--sness of ·meta-
physical statements and questions;· this ·is· ·on.e ·o·f his m·ain 
purposes and ends. It may also lle see:Ti' ·:t>r~?.-t b.y claiming 
that the informal question-s: are: mea.ningles:s. he serves thcfs:e 
purposes rather well, even t:·h.oiJ;gh: :it ·is· done rather crude:ly~ 
" 
. 
• 1. e. , '' -with a -s1e·dge hammer . On t h.e other hand, · it is nt)·t: 
clear that there are any compelling re·asons to ·ac_c .. e·pt. his 
fiat. with regards to informal questions unless of course we 
·share in Cafrnap 1 s purposes a~d see that ,acceptance of the 
dictum adequately .serves those purpose.?· 
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. . ~ When Carnap asserts· that a question is meaningless, ~ ' .. 
- we sho~ld not find this in the least·upsetting. For all we 
L,.-
. ·are to understand by his assertion is that the quest·ion is 
. . 
informal. But C~rnap starting with his very narrow sense 
of me.aningful, and his dedication to his task of abolishing 
metaphysics, thin,ks that h~. has said a good .deal more.. He 
.. 
thinks ·that be not. on·ly has put forth a criterion for what 
is meaningful, if one w·ants: .to relegate metaphysics to the 
meaningless, or at bes~, not to talk about meta~hysics; but 
more strongly for what is meaningful (without the proviso 
. - '• 
~~' . 
pertaining t·o metaphysics), · With .a certain end in view, 
Carnap arrives at a criterion~ f.or the meaningful, and once 
he obtains this criterion he forgets just wpy· h'e has devised 
it and thinks· that he has obtairted a criterion for ·the 
meaning.ful- which applie.s aG.ross the board. 
" 
Now ff ·1t were the case and agreed· by all tha.t all 
metaphysic:al., or more precisely, all informal (external) 
questions .were meaningle$s, then we would al.low Carnap's 
unrestricted generalizat-ion. 1 Some· bf us, however, are not 
so sure. And although we ·grant that some informal questions 
. . . -Ja 
may turn out upon analysis to be meaningl~ss, we will not 
.. , a._llow all of those .statemen.ts to .be tht;own·: 19u,t a:t:' .one fell 
swoop so as. to satisfy Carnap's predilectiot1s. :can ·he 
ju~tify pis cri,terion for. the meaningful? No. 
him a primary ptinciple. 
·~. 
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Now if w~ are. concerned with questions· that do express .. 
\ 
• 
a genuirie intellectual anxiety (and not just those which can 
. be· "neatly" ·answered) but whi-ch, nevertheless, do not sugge.st 
\ . 
-or determine the form that their answers will take, we shall 
then find Carnap's dictum g:rossly inappropriate and indeed 
;somewhat simple-minded~9 
So if we are intere·sted in dealtn:g with a certain class 
.of stat.ements ___ whi.ch prima;~tacie are indeed meaningful (al-
-;, 
// ;, 
·,< f ,c· 
t_hough as we have indicated earlier, some, but not necessarily 
:all, of them may turn out to be mea~ingless upon analysis) 
w.e must reject Carnap's dictum as being grossly inappropriate 
_if not false. In fact we shall late_r show that if accepted, 
it would inipe.de ._not: qp.ly pqi1,qs~dP~Y., ·bu·t- also: the growth of 
• science. 
I shall now take :up: rno.re s·p·e.giJ',ica·l._ly .t·he claim that, 
by my own· showing, th.e chq·ice between t·he two frames of 
· reference in que·st:ion. is. arbitrary. In the first chapt.e-r-
I -have argued ·that the choice of frames of reference .i.s 
arbitrary and dependent upon one's purposes. But I also 
argued that, if the same ends were shared, then one framework 
t :r' .. 
would more adequately serve those ends than others. Now to 
.. the extent .. that both Carnap and Myhill are concern~d with 
determining meaningful questions, they do share the same en~; 
. 
' 
9Precis:e1y· why will be made clear later; essentially ~ t turns~ 
on· the fact that. there are _meaningful informal que,stions -
see pages 36 and 38. 
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,1\ ho.wever,·· in that Carnap~ is obses .. $..ed with the abolition of 
.. 
metaphysics, i.e., in. that he has prejudged all questions 
) 
of ,this kind as meaningless, _his ends become more narrow·' 
than Myhill:' s. · Consequently, they can not be viewed as I . . 
two-·- equal ~l ternati ves devised to achieve the same ends. 
Howeve·r if we share in Carnap's prejudice,. then Myhill' s: · 
t, approach would be inappropriate. for it· would allow, at lea,st 
in part, what our prejudice wishes t·o exclude. But to the 
extent that we are concerned with determining and not pre-
scribing what is meaningful, and Carnap would have us believe 
that he is doing the former, to that extent we may consi'der 
them to be competing alternatives,_ and Myhill Is approach 
is then superior for it does not exclude in an a priori 
fashion a large class of questions which· are not only genuine,. ·, 
but at .least some of them ( as will b.e seen) are. also meaning-
ful_ ... 
I have claimed tha·t Carnap's dictum is simple-mipded .. ~ .. " 
-.a,nd that it impedes philos_ophy and the growth ,of science. 
. 
,i~ 
. •· To a,oid the rejoinder that I am muddle-headed, I shall now 
• 
. 
J make an attempt to justify my claim by bringing Jorth the 
long-promised examples of significant informal questions. 
The disastrous effects of Carnap's dictum for philosophy , 
are clear, if we take philosophy to be concerned with ipform~l, 
. 
;' 
;' 
objective questions. .But -- and this is the important point . . 
for the present disc~ssion -~ the _di tum is almo·st as dis-
I 
. astrous for· scien·c·-~, for a.-lthou_gh s.cience is: not thereby 
I• 
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• 
abolished., the growth of it is. This i·s .. s·o for the relatively 
precise· frameworks of ·-science ar·e not. simply handed to us 
ready-made so· that all we have to do is manipulate the . 
. 
symbols to work out the consequences; nor are we handed all 
.. 
possible frameworks· from- W:hich we must merely choose. Quite· 
" the contrary. Those very nea~· and beauti.ful. sys.terns must be 
discovered (created?) and they never would b~ if we were·to 
,, 
restrict ourselves to meaningful ques.tic,~s of the Carnapian 
brand, i.e.,' internal question:s. 
Consider the kinds of ques,t:i:ons wp·ic.h l·ea:d. to the 
construction of new fr.amew:orks. ·They must indeed be inform.al, 
./I 
~ ,for i.f they . could be a·sk~d: within the old framework ( and thus 
·y .. · 
be internal) they could not lead·to the overthrow of that 
framework. Since the ·asking of internal questions presupposes 
and in vol v~s the· very categories and methods of the frameworl{., · 
in.quiries which -bring into question those categories and 
methods cannot be themselves carried out in that framework. ,\ . 
The ,preceding is predicated on the assumption tha.t the frame-
. works are consistent. If a contradiction should arise in a 
' 
framework, that, would b··e: a sign that something needed revision: 
or radical change-. But th·is wou.l·d only be a case where the 
given framework ( rather a result within· the framework). served 
as an impe·tus to construct a new, or modified framework. · 
i•, . 
The framework itself would be inadequate for the actual job 
of constructing, and we would have to go beyond it in some 
way to develcJp a new and better one. · 
,-
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Th.is :t-s ·,pre·ci.sely the.-,'., .. s-ituat,ion with the Specia"l Th~o·ry. 
of.Relativity {·sTR). It. ·1s not,· t~ be denied that th~re were 
indeed difficul ti~s in the classical theo-ry (Newton-Maxwell~ 
N_-M) ~hi-·cn ·initiated Einstein' ·s speculations, but N-M theory 
itself in no waj provided or could provide the conceptual 
apparatus which was ultimately necessary. To obtain this 
/ 
"apparatus" he had to transcend the classical theory, i.e., 
he had to leave the realm of the formal (N-M theory) an.a 
enter that -of the informal. Having entered this latter 
'~ ', . ~ .. 
·:~ realm, he was able to transform what was relevant to his 
concerns into a new form.al theory which was distinct and 
superior to the classical theory. FinallY, I infer that 
. ..;" 
,. 
' 
s:in.ce he did ask informal questions which did result in an 
e·1aborate and -beautiful theory of unquestionable worth, 
'that·· this establishes the existence of some informal que.s't.:ions 
wh.i·ch ar:e extremely si.gnificant· (meaningful). 
What precisely these informal questions were I do not 
kn·ow, but that they were informal is indisputable; the only 
alternative is to· say that N-M theory is .inconsistent, for 
if the questions Einstein asked were indeed formal, then he 
was able to generate a theory out of N-M that was incompatib.le·. 
with it. But there is no good reason to suppose N-M td ~e-
incO~;i~ent. So "~ince it is incomp~tible with N-M, Einstein 
.could have never arrived at STR if' he stayed within N-M, 
~ 
·:i:.e., if he stayed within the formal realm. That·--is to say 
. ,., :• 
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that s·ince STR and N-M are incompatible· it is impossi.ble 
that the same framework that was sufficient to generate N-M 
' coul also be adequate to generate STR. Hence t·o arrive at 
• fl 
,I 
~-!'._-
· S.TR E nstein needed to be· concerned with informal consider-., 
1 . 
- - ., 
at ions .. • 
Now ·the· :b.a;sis for my claim tha.t STR · and N-M are in-
compatible is the_ very distinct a.nd fundamental differences 
in the two theories betwe·en the 6otions of spa<;:!e, · time, and 
,ma.ss. These differences should be sufficie.nt to estalbish 
t.he· incompatibility, but many would deny thi~ claim. Tri~y 
• 
w.ou1·a argue that N-M can be sho.w·n to b-e, ·a special case of: 
$TR when the appropriate restriction (such as (v/c ) 2< < 1) , 
are appli.ed to the latter theor,y.. ,. But :th:is ali·e·ged reduction 
.J 
of STR to N-M is no reduction at all: a ta:ctt reinterpretation 
c)f the variables -X.·, y, z, t ·obtains in th~ pseu·do--.deri va tion 
. 
making it ille.gi timat·e-. For· tho·se va:riab.Ie·s,: representing 
$pac-e and ti·me., rnedn quite different thin,gs in the two 
theories. 10 The two sets of equations, however, will yield 
(-when restrict:ions are applied to the· STR set) the same ( for 
experimental purposes) computational va,lu.es:, an·d it is thi$ 
' (probably) that· has mislead some into .belteving that- a 
reduction has be··en, effected. Note further that even if we 
were . to overlook the reinterpretation o·f variables alluded 
to above, that N-M is a spec·tal c:ase ·or STR is still not 
shOWil. For even when (v/e) 2<< t tb:e equatiolls of N-M theory, 
·10 Thoma.s S. Kuhn. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp.· 98-101 .. Chicago, Illinois: Phoenix Books, The University 
of Chtcago Press~ 1964 . 
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· are not spec-iar··c·a.·se.s of those of STR. · True- 1 t is. that for . . -~ . I 
V experimental purposes the difference in values is so s·light t, 
~ 
" 
· that it probably ·could never be detected (no, matter how 
sophisticated and refined future experimentai techniques and 
devices become~. Neverthel:ess there · is a discre.pancy (no 
matter how small) and thi~ is of theoretical importance. 
H~nce even if the t&cit reinterpretation.of variables is 
i_gnored, - t.he theorie·s still. cio not a-gree (precisely), and. :.s::o: 
N-M is n.ot a speqial ·case. o·f STR. Thus the argument to ,.•: 
establish the· compatibilit.y ·of the two theorie_s fail·s and 
-Il.lY orig·inal claim stands:· 
A similar si tuatio-n ob·t:a·f·ns when one ·coh-s·id.ers the . .. . - . . .. . . . . . .. 
transition from Aristotelian to Galilean ph~sics. Arid in 
t·his connection Feyerabend makes the same point as above: 
" ... man is not only capable of using theories and languages but that he is also capable of invehting them. How else could-.it have _been possible, to mention only_ one example, to replace the Aristotelian physics and the Aristotelian cosmology with the new physics 
.... 
of ·Galileo and Newton? The only conceptual apparatus~then available was the Aristotelian theory of change with its opposition of actual 
_and potential properties, the four causes, and the like. Within this conceptual scheme, which was also us~d for the description of experimental results, Galileo's (or rather Descartes') law of inertia does not make sense, nor can it be formulated. "11 
... 
11Paul K. Feyerabend, p. 89. "Explanation, Reduction, and Empiricism," in Minnesota Studies in °the Philosophy of Science. Vol .. III; Scientific Expla.nation, Space anOTime, edited by H~rbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell, Minneapolis, Minnes,ota.: University of Minnesota, Press,. 1962. (For much that i,s enlightening here, see also the t other work by this autho~ cited in the bibliography.) 
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--- -. Carnap .. does~ not preclut-de the Einsteins and the Galileos; .. · .r 
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that in fact what happened is that a.t first Galileo and then 
Einstein gave us successively better and more frui.tful frame-
works to de41 with the world than did their.predecessors. 
This is indeed the case. Once alterna_tive f!)ameworks (say 
the Newtonian and the Einsteinian) are given we may determine 
which is more fruitful, expedient, etc. But the stress on 
ftgiven'" is important. 
., 
It is indee-d true that -Carnap's 
" -
analy·sis does apply to frameworks that are at our disposal,. 
,1': 
---
but it also rules out of court the asking_of a question in 
·the informal (external) sense and hence questions which lead 
to the construction of new frameworks. It is only when these 
(informal) questions are asked and thoroughly considered are 
we in a position to construct a new frame~ork. Then, and 
only the!), can we determine whether the framework is or is 
not more fruitful. · This is one very good re:as·or1 why informal I 
questions are important., and meaningful,· for it· is in 
p 
considering these that the big advance·s in :s.cienc,e· ·b··e:com.e 
possible.· 
Just as a chil)d at certain stage may spurn his pare·nts, 
f"'orgetting that· much of what he is is due to the-ir previous 
work, so Carnap being impressed by the precision, clarity and 
.... 
progress of science has forgotten or failed to·realize just 
~ 
what has made its major advances possible. 
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. The ·case .. o·f Einstein and relativity theory, it is· believed, 
. 
·~. ~ 
. may be taken as an il~ustration of Myhill '·« statement·· th·at 
"the philosophical area shrinks·progressively, yielding 
----·--·-·---·-··-~- ·-· place to science",~2 and the transition of what is informal 
. to what is 'formal-.. For it was by asking informal {philos~phicai) 
questions that Einstein was led to develop the theory of 
. ·relativity and thus,_ ultimately, providing a formal ( scie-nt:i.ftc-J 
C'%> 
framework. 
-.,,.;-.-:,;., ..... ...,_-.:.--·· ·-····-· -
• , ,I, • 
r 
So the charge that Carnap's U.11derstan·d·:1ng: o:f informal· 
_question is simple-minded rests on h·1s· exclusive attention to 
..,,,.,...,,. 
-
w:hat might (inade,quately) be de·sc·ribed as the ~justification 
of given frameworks_ and moreover,~' by ~aking all informal 
,1 r questions to be meaningless a.nd thereby precluding what may 
·' 
(inadequately) be described as the discovery of new frameworks. 
·v 
We now tu-rn .. to consider Carna.p' s alleged uontological 
; 
.-neutra.li ty';·;_ w·ha;·t is meant by t_he l_atter may be seen from .-. 
the ·following statement:. 
"We may stilJ..sp.e:ak (and have done so) of 
'the acceptance of new entities' since this form o·f,, speech is customary; but one.- must_ keep in mind that this phrase does not mean for us anything more than acceptance of the 
new framework, i.e., of the new linguistic forms. Above.all, it must not be inter-preted as referring to an assumption; belief, 
or assertion of 'the reaTi ty of the entities'. n13 
12Myhill, p. 60; 
13 . . ~ · Carnap, p. -241. Emphasis my own. Further assertions of this sort toget~er with his'claim th~t the acceptance of frame-work does not commit· one to· the reality of the entities may be f·ound on pp. 235,241;242,244,247, et.al. 
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·we see that he h·as a;voided the ontological que·s·tion by . ~. . ... 
cla.iming that our acceptance of new .. entities ·aoe-s not commit 
us in any way to the reality of the entities, for the basis 
of the acceptance is not its tru·th or fa_lsity but ra.ther its 
fruitfulness, expedi.e.ncy, and· conduciveness for the aim for· 
which the language was intended. For Carnap ''the acceptance 
Cl.I .... 
of new entities II is ju·st a facon de palor, wp.at is actually ,._ 
involved is the acceptance of a new framework. Presumably, 
t·hough, any linguistic framework -- if it is to be meaningful 
·<·~ 
_·.:.. is about the world. Being about the world it must tell 
us, in some way, what the world is 1 ike. Now, of course, 
the linguistic framework in question may be mistaken -- the 
world may not be. the way. tt te.11:s µ,s that it is·. (Note that 
the telling need not be e~p_lic·i.t. ·l So ·1.r· ·we :a-c:~ept a frame-
work we are implicitly· accepting t:'hat world view. But it 
is also important to realize that we may persist in the use· 
. 
of a< language while our understanding of the- terms and/or 
relations (at least in our reflective moments) has changed 
radically. (An example of the latter is forthcoming.) 
Now if we are only concerned with practical-, functional, 
. or computational affairs and procedures, it· is indeed true 
that our language in no way commits as to any ontology. 
That • is, the langua.ge is not used to "say" anything about the 
world, but only as! instrument for doing things in the world. 
And if this is a.11 that we are concerned with then Carnap is 
., 
; 
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i·s · appropriate. -
I On the other han·d if we are concerned with more than 
just "doing" then we cannot pretend that we are ju.st con-
c·erned with the fruitfulness of ·language. How that language· 
is interpreted ( "hooked up with the world") ·is o.f significance 
and does say_ something about the world; what it says is not-
-_ just that the language is "fruitful. " ,, 
When Can:):ap insists that the acceptance of a framework 
-"' ls '-'not to be interpreted as referring to an assumption, 
,, 
belief, or assertion of 'the reality of the entities'," he 
severs any relation. b.etween the language and the world. For 
i 
even if the linguistic frameworks of which he speaks are 
. 
interpreted (the,re i-s reason to think t:hey are not, and if 
they are not the following point is t:-ha·t much\stronger) 
they are not about the world. What he has given·by an 
~ interpretation is revo.ked by his insisten_c-e th.at .no b-el.-te·f, 
as.sumption, or assertion is beirig made as to the reallty o·f 
. 
the.entities. If the linguis.tic terms are about or do 
-
designate entities i·n t·he: ~orld (.which is what an interpre-
• 
tation would i.mply) then there is .at least an asse~rtion of 
the reality of the entities, if not~ an assumption or a 
·belief in ·them. We may, per~aps, test that,assertion·to see 
if we should believe ·1nt '1 t_, and to t·est the assertion we 
would assume it to b~ true. 
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Let us ·consider· a particular case. Carnap. _rejects · the 
external question as to the reality.of the thing world itself . 
_, 
. 
,, . 
as being meaningless, an·d he claims that what is involved is 
the practical questi6h as to· whether or not we should accept 
' 
. 
and use th,~ ·forms of expression in 'the framework in question, 
viz. the thing world. He also· suggests that we may choose 
to cease using the thing language arid instead use for example · 
\ 
· a phenomenal language
1 • But: this .description is surely absurd. lo 
,. 
When one denies '·t_he thing world on·e is not· making linguistic 
recommendations with rega.rds to our usage of terms, but, 
rather, what meaning or understanding should be ascribed ·t6 
those ·terms· regardless of their nfrui tfulness." Thus we ·cou-ld 
.. 
. yery well reject the world of things as consisting of "massy-" 
entities existing independently pf a mind perceiving them 
an,.d still continue to use the thing language ( for its use 
would still be ftui tful ), but now wha.t we understand by 
:"··thing" will be ·different than under the previous interpre-
tation or under·standing of a thing.. In suggesting this 
.. alternative .W)der.stariding it is not claimed, nor believed 
that the resulting language w.ould be more frui tfal. Observe 
that the preceding is precisely what Berkeley ~di_~:· he gave 
an analysig· :cof ma.tter (~hether it was correct or n,ot 1·s no·t: .. 
. -·~ important for our purposes). which resulted in the rejecti,o·~r,;:·:"_,.,, 
of a certain conception of matter in favor of 
• 
another, but 
,'• 
. 
. ' . 
·. we need not, nor did he recommend that we should cease speaking 
.f' 
as we di·d before the analysis. ·rr what has now been said 
. 
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.i. is accepted, viz. that one can change hi-s understanding or 
interpretat.ions of various. terms or kinds of terms and, 
I perhaps, their relatio.ns, _without changing or even recommending 
• 
a, change in .the language used to talk about those tenris, then 
a very importan·t consequence obtains: we can still derive 
(.trivially) an affirmative answer to the 1nterna1·question 
•' 
·~ as. to the existence· of things· (since we have not changed the 
,language), but this- f s of utterly no significance ~e~~use we 
may still be reje~cting·· the reality of the things. Moreover 
this rejection is n.ot "meaningless" · just because· it involves 
"t.he reali,ty of things", for _we have shown that we, are ·.n:ot 
.,._,_ 
co11,1pelled to acce:pt Carna.p' s fiat. This is true, of course,: 
only w-itn .. the proviso that "reality" not be understood i11 a. 
,tr:ansce.ndent sense .. 
In addition concern about the re_ality of ·thlngs is a 
eaenuine concern. Thus so long as we keep the thing language 
( and we a-re we11-~·advised to) we may a.ssert internally ·that 
there are things, but the interpretation of this statement 
' may vary and unless we know what int~rpretation is being 
- assumed the statement says little, if indeed it says anything 
...,. . 
at all. Furthermore once an interpretation i.s given it ma.y 
be found to be either true or false, i.e.,. t.he acceptance of·· 
the entities understood in a certain way, and they must always 
be understodd in some way, will be ~ontingent upon the cogency .. . 
of the arguments for that pa~ticular interpretation . Thus 
for example· we may find a crucial fla.w in Berkeley's· analysis. 
,· 
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-which woul·d. lead us, t-.o .. assert that the way which he wants 
us to und·erstand ~(1.nterpret) matter is' false. Matter jus.t 
can't" be that way because .... And yet all the while we 
•, 
w-ill have mainta·ined°' the thing language_. 
' ' 
Another example of this sort is the trivial derivation 
··:"""'Five' designates a number." (p.244) All of us can agree 
with this derivation but just wp.at is. understood by number 
may ·easily vary. And it i·s what is understood by number, 
. ' i.e. , what analysis we ar~ willing to accept, which is of 
ontological. s:ignifican~e. 
->---Iri tnes·e two examples lfnumb.er": and "'matter" play analogous 
.r·oles as it is clear in both -c·ase·s that a~ though each of the .. 
terms occur in only one lin-gui-s:tic frame each may be op.en to 
various interpretations. I~t _ is this latter fact which 
suggests that these linguistic fra.mes are very ciose to un-
interpreted formal syste.ms. But we stron:g~y· ,suspect that 
Carnap did not in-tend this and he did not see it as a resul-t 
because he was implicitly presuming some absolute (particula;r) 
interpre!!!:J~~,- -~~d of course that absolute interpretation 
. is none other than the empirical, common sense frame. ~' 
• Now if Carnap is hesitant to ad.mi t the reality of tJJe, 
-:entities because he unders~ands reality in an absolute o~.: 
transcendent sense, then he i.s right. I have shown in -~ 
Chapter I that it is impossible to clai-m any knowledge of . 
. such entities even if· there were any. --But "reality" also. 
has a sense when it is un.derstood as being relative to: a . 
.. ' 
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The questi.on "What, en.ti ties really are there?" . 
__ then means "given one's. po1nt of 1.riew (f~ame---e-f- -re-f-erence-,. 
which is n.ot ·the -same' as a lingui.st·ic framework); in what 
kind(sl) of entities does the world manifest itself?;;:·· Put 
in another way, "g.iven a particular world slice, what are 
-;;J· 
. 
·its building blocks?" (The c·oncluging paragrap_h of Chapter I 
may be instructive here). In. this sense then, it is legiti-
~ 
' mate to speak of the reality of the entitie-s, and this is · ·· 
as close to Reality that humans, as we are now constructed., 
are ever going to get. 
Of course we may change our minds as to which en·t:t·tie·s 
.:~_re, ·real ( or fundamental} for any given framework, b-ut that ,, 
1 ,. 
(., · .... 
'-,-~--.--•M•...-----•·-- -------• --· - -- - < 
i-s , just _getting clearer as to what way the framework :is ___ ,,,_.__ 
about the world .. 
-~-. I·f what I have s:aid is ac_cepted, it i.s· :see·n: t.hat Carnap 
is in error when he claims that both tne .-sceptic and the 
nominalist are mistaken whe;n they refuse to admit abstrac·t. 
entities-~ for in refusing :they are treating the question 
as to their existence theoretically (i.e. internally) in-
stead of practically. I maintain that the question is not 
merely the practical one as to wh.e·ther a mode of spee·ch 
referring to abstract enti t-ie.s is_: mor:e frui·tfi.11 than one 
which does not. 
'. What the nominaiist. is concerned· with is whether there 
• 
.. 
is a place for abstract entities in the world as he sees it. 
,Jqw· 1Since the answer to the question partially define·s his 
,. 
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i.e., ___ it_ is ~_ .. _fund.a1'!ental principle., the question 
,,. ' 
• I ' ... f 
- ~ 
J' 
_ as I have firs.t pos·ed!. it is not too exciting: there simply 
. 
, is n-o place for- such entities in a nominalistic world. 
But the nominali-st sees his world as the.-w-orld ·and-~s·o·--1s· .,, 
-,not-'· prepared to allow alternative points of view. 
Al though I do no.t accept this notion of "the world" as 
tenable, there is· still ~a point ·to the nominalist 's argument,s 
• 
against those who a~sert the existence of abstract entities .. 
~--
In .Point of fac .. t~=tne nominalist is not just concerned wi~-h 
ab.olishing abstract. entities: :he has many other· concerns too. 
" ~ 
And these other int·ere:st·s ·and c·oncerns cause his total frame-
work to overlap with others, say the platonist's. To the 
· extent that there is overlap between the total fram~work of 
the platonist and the total framework. of the nominalist, to 
that extent the controversy ,is meaningful and important. 
. i.• 
Similar remar·ks ·are appropriate for any of the other tradition.al 
llsc·hool--s"· i:n p·hil-osophy and the disputes that obtain among and 
w..1t·hin them. 
The preceding accoun.t of philosophical, .d.isputes· f:it·s 
, 
rather well with Myhill' s ·clatJns that philosophy is c.oncernea 
with informal objective· que s.tions and that, in fact,_.. there 
.. 
are no objective informal questions, but only ones that 
approximate ~t to varying degrees. Since there is only 
. 
approximation to objective informal questions there is room 
• 
· for gen~ine controversy, which is further explained by the 
overlapping (which is rarely complete) of the frameworks . 
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A -final .poin·t of clarificat~ion,- I .have often u·sed 
t:he term. "metaphysics_" in this' 1paper and have b_e.en 
I • 
concerned with defending the value of metaphysical quest.iq:tt-s~'.,: 
. . 
' . . 
. 
. o in · so doing· I did not mean, rio:~ have I ~een committed to 
asserting, that ~11 metaphysical questic>ns and statements 
are meaningful. . As has been mentione·d, · s_ome indeed may 
turn out upon ana1y·sis .and invest-igatlon to be meaningless. 
The important point to note is that all metaphysical 
,questions and assert.ions are informal in nature, but that. 
" 
this in itself, i.s not sufficient reason to deny them 
--.. 
c<1gn:iti,ve meaning before they h·c;tve· had their h_e.aring. 
F· .. or qur cognitive studies, they· (in some cases) ,will :be· 
:t::h·e most fruitful and important ·questions tha-t ·we ·w·111 
,consider. Unfortunately we cannot always t~·-11 in advance 
which .of t:h:ese qlJ.estions- wi.11 ·b~ wo.tt.ri pursuing and whic:h. -
" . ,./
" 
not·, ·t_.<J" do this the 1ft 9nly opt:ion °1-:s :'':hdn~st --toil" and t.he 
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CHAPTER III 
FACTS 
., 
.. 
. 
Consider the_ case of scienti.fic facts.. {I shal-1 often-
I 
s_peak of "facts" when° what is meant is "statement of fact.") 
* - lj 
, .I.t is my contention that these facts are only facts·:··in so 
.· far as they-are understpod thr6~gh some s~ieriti.fic theory. 
· But then, sin,ce our theories sometimes (radically) change, 
' '·· 
. 
. 
s·o do the facts - what the facts are changes-with the theory~ 
!Note, .too, that all scientific theories will have a certain 
·factual core, but what precisely that core is, is always. 
, .. rel_t:tti·v.e. t·o that ·thec,_ry.- Furthermore, it ·-wilJ. be shown_ 
·., t:nat ,. t:here are no fao·t:·s:. which purportedi-y· ar:e -n.ot dependent.:_ 
·on any theory whatso:ever .. 
_,,., One o_f. ·tn.e key features ·whsich make the foregoing :re·ai-
.mark=s _true is that any disc.qve;ry involves recognizing n:ot 
only that something.is, but also what it is. 14 This double 
:aspe-ct of discovery is. beautifully· illustrated: by Kuhn by 
., 
:·means of an example taken _from the history of ·chemis_try 
. 
' 
:c'Oncerning the discovery of oxygen. Joseph Priestley had 
.a claim to the discovery of· this gas for h-e: 
collected- the gas released by heated red 
·oxide of mercury as one item in a prolonged 
normal investigation of the "airs" evolved 
by a large number of solid substances. In 1774 h~ identified the gas thus produced·· 
as nitrous oxide and in 1775, led by further 
tests, as' colillllon air with less than its 
usual quantity of phlogiston.15 
14 ,, 
- Kuhn, p.· .55· 
15 . .. ,, 
Ibid,.• , P · 5 3 · 
., 
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.Lav.oisier also had a cl'8.im. to the discovery, n~ 
started the work that led him to oiygen 
after Priestley,' s experi-nients of 1774 
and possibly· as the result of a hint from Priestly. Early in 1775 Lavoisier reporte-d 
that the gas obt~ined by heating the red 
oxide of mercury was "air itself entire 
without alteration [except that] ... it ·comes 
out more pure, more respirable. " By 1777, probab_ly with the assistance of a second hint from Priestley, La~oisier had concluded r 
that the gas was a distinct species, one of 
the two main constituents of the atmosphere, 
a conclusio~ that Priestley was never able 
to accept .... Priestley's claim to the discovery of oxygen:is based upon his priority in isolating a gas that was later recognized 
as a distinct species. But Priestley's sample 
was not pure, and, if holding impure oxygen in one's hands is to discover it, that had been done by everyone who ever bottled atmospheric 
air. Besides, if Priestly was the discoverer, 
when was the discovery made? In 1774 he thought he had obtained nitrous oxide, a species he 
already knew; in 1775 he saw the gas as. dephlogisticated air, which is still not 
oxygen or even, for phlogistic chemists, a quite unexpected sort of gas. Lavoisier's 
claim may qe stronger,· b~t it presents the same= problems. tt we refuse the palm to_Priestley, 
we cannot award it to Lavoisier for the work 
of 1775 which led him to identify the gas as 
the "air i~self entire." Presumably we wait for 
the work of 1776 and 1777 which led Lavoisier 
to see not merely the gas but what the gas was. Yet even this award could be questioned, for in 1777 and to the end of his lif·e Lavoisier in-
sisted that oxygen was -~Jl atomic "principle of 
acidity" and that. oxigen gas was formed only :f 
when that "principle 1 united with calori~-;-· ·the 
matter of heat. Shall we therefore say that 
oxygen ·h~d not yet been discovered in_l777? 
· · Some may ~e temped to do ·so. But the principle 
of acidity was not banished from chemistry until 
~-.... 
,'!-• • 
· after 1810, and caloric lingered until the 1860 '-s. Oxygen had become a standard 1~emical substance 
.· b·efore either of those dates. · · 
16Ibid., PP~ 53-56, 
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. Of eourse no effort to s·e"ttl,e the matter a·s regards · to 
·,, 
who discovered oxygen when will even be attempted here, 17 
the point being to have shown that discovery involves more 
_than observing that something is: t.he' case. It is here . \ 
where we begin to see why -fa.cts must: be ·µhderstood ·through 
.. 
some theory. Given that something is the ca~e, to determine~ 
what it is demands the mediation of some theory. The inter-
pretation of what is o:bserved (e.g. a chemical reaction in 
-a flask, a meter read:ing, ·a cloud chamber phc,tograph, etc.) 
' 
:1._s :inextricably bound up wl_t:h a theory. What the observations 
. . 
18 and measurements me~n. · . is determined by the: going theory . 
.. 
. -In this connection Feyerabend remarks: 
,. 
If a certain theory is replaced by a different theory with a different ontology, 
then we may have to revise the interpre-
tation of all our measurements, however 
self-.evident such a particular interpretation 
may have become in the course of time: 
according to the phlogiston theory, measure~ 
ments of weight before and after combustion 
are measurements of the amount of phlogiston 
_added or lost in the process~ Today we must give a completely different interpretation of 
those measurements.19 ~ 
I7 Indeed, Kuhn suggests that the. Situation d.escribed is 
· reason to think that such questions are no·t appropriate t .. o di s cove ry , p . 54 . · · · " · 
18ThiS~ ta.lk of· t.he: ;,meanin~ of observations a"rid measurements" 
··is ... to. _be contrasted with· the simple reporting of the readings 
and observations. Unless these are incorporated into a theory, one reading, for example, is as good as another. Thus without a theory to interpret (however,·crudely) our 
results, what we now know to be a voltmeter ma.y just as 
~ell read c;,ne volt as one billion volts. · 
l9Feyerabend, p. 37. 
·-~· -
i . 
\. 
--- --·--· ~ 
-
/ 
·1 
-----•-•-• .. ••'•- --- - - _.• ,<'•-.:...... • • M' ..:....:---" ------=-..-• •••-•••'"•··•--
-- ---·· ----- ----- --- --·- .. , ,..,.; . 
-
- . 
,- - -· -----·---- -· 
....... , .• 
I 
• I 
I 
II 
, . 
. it 
I 
I 
•I r 
I 
,, 
y 
., 
,, 
] 
II 
''!Ill 
!I I 
" 
.,. .. 
)• 
I 
.. 
,. 
There is. still V more. in ·our observatio~s..) that ·presuppose _ 
. . .. . / - -. . : 
:a theory ... For· it is ·our theories which determine how an 
. 
' 
. instrument is constructed. (The cycl<?tron that· is built 
.. 
• • I • 
under the assumption that mass increases with velocity, i.e., 
- with relativity theory as the guide, is not the s~me as. the 
1: 
one t-hat would be built according to the classic~l laws; 
hence what is obse·rved,1 with its . use will be different than 
.. 
that observed by means of the other.) This point cannot be 
as - easily ignored as some would ·preten:d. Moreover, it brings 
into relief the fac:t that diffe-rent t_neories have different 
fa·ctu,al co.res. Since the type of appafat.1.l~ we build will 
d.e:'l:ihe·:ate _what is obs.erved, and :s:in:ce the theories we main.t.atn· 
w-1:11 determine not only the constrt1c.ti.on of ·the apparatus.,_ 
·b:u:t also the kind of apparatus whi.c:11.: is built, 1.t r·o-llows 
. 
t.·ha-t. :the range of phenomena tl'lat are taken int:o account.- wi,11 
:be :u·ltimately limited by the theories. No theory accounts 
f-pr nor is even concerned with a.11 types of phenomena. It 
1$_ t-h.eor;ies that determine the relevance 6-f a fact. - But the 
'· 
· pan·g,e of phenomena. which a theory is: concerned with is the 
:fa-c.tual core of a theory; and so 1.t ,.is seen that the fac.tu:a1 
core will vary with the theory. : Thi.s also makes it - clear-'wh_y: 
it is rather naive to ~ay: "kn.owledge must be founded: ·on the 
fact:s·." Which facts is i.t to be founded upon? The fact_s 
of theory T1 , or T2 , or . . . .. . Such a simple statement of· 
what the foundations of knowledge ought to be is of n.o ·h_e:l_p 
whatsoever. 
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It wili be recalled that. in the opening of this chapter 
1.· ~lso· made a much stronge,r · claim than the above in regard 
, to the relativity of facts - I cla:Lmed that what the facts 
' are changes. Th.is has already been hinted, at in Chapter II 
, 
where I spoke of the distinctne.s.s of the. classical and - , 
' 
.. 
relativiStic theories. What is critical here (a:s~t was 
t·.here) is tha.t the notions of space and time are radically 
different in the two theories. :;Butt any empirical fact that 
qbtains does so ·"in and through"· space and time so that if 
these basic notion9 ~re -diffe.:rent. i.n the. two theories (as· 
they are), cert.~inly the fa:c:ts w:,t.l·1· be: d.ifferent. And the \ 
.d:·iff erence is not just tha:t they fall wi·t;hin different 
,·r.anges of phenomena, i.e. , they are parts of different factual 
cores, but what they themselves are is different. Now the 
----------
" 
last of my claims in the opening.paragraph is.to be established~ 
' ,· 
That claim is that the so~called facts whi.ch are not dependent 
,· 
upon any theory ·constitute a vacuous set·~ That this is not 
always seen is a\ Feyerabend points ou:t20, because it is 
generally assumed that that· wh·ich .is: niO$'t fundamental --
.. . . ,:::,' thought or sensation,·. tbeory o·r· o.b·ser-va.ti·on -- can be, d~c-,.i·C,·.e'.:d: .. 
independent1y_ of research. ,.·The answer usually, being t·hat·.' 
sensation and observation are the most fundamental and thu:s 
·are more reliable and certain. But he argues that this 
pos~ tion is untenable since •t ••• experience is one of tl1e: 
20Pa.ul K. Feyerabend. "Problems of Empiricism", p.147, in Beyond the Edge of Certainty: Essays in Contempqrary Scie·nc,e and Philosophy. Edited by Robert G. Colodny. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentite-Hall, Inc;, 1965. · 
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- I ' ~ .p~ocesses _dGc~rring in the world. ,, '[ An,ci ] it · ·1 s up· "':to 
detailed re·s-earch ·to tell us what its nature is, for surely 
. ' 
we cannot be allowed t·o decide ·about the mo~t ·fundamental 
. . 
.,.,.-
- . . . .. . . ,· · 21 
. . 
.~hing without_ qareful ~ .. research. T.o suppose that we o.ould 
""' •.- decide and,. moreover, that the .mear1s upon which we_ dectd:e:d 
are adequate fo-_r presenting the world as it is;- is, I 
.;,_ 
' believe, gro-s::s·.ly n.El·i·ve. lt smatks of a strong ego-centris~ 
~ 
wh·ich parallels very :C!.lo·sely a fashionable belief of another 
.. 
t 
, t·ime, viz. that the ea:r·t·h· w~s t.h_e center of the uni verse. 
The similarity in th.e two belief'·s is that man must occupy 
' •, 
a privileged pos.ition. ·in: t.he· t.otal scheme of t~ings. Thu:s: 
in the· first case- it ·is :s·upposed that the ]>:erceptual or 
....... 
' met1:tal .(whl:cp of t·l';lese it is depends upon the decision_) 
.. :ap:paratu.s- of man nius·t be such as to enable him to ·know how . . • ,. I 
t:h.~-- w.o:rld is and not merely how it may seem_ to be. While 
;in the second 9~·s:e it is suppo_sed that since f·rom man's 
' -- _,--,_ -
vantage poin,t ·the· ·h:ea.vens revolve about the- ·p'lane:t, whi-on 
he inhabit .. $, it: :m:ust indeed be that way. 
N·ow· :it c.oul;d have been that the earth d:id ,t:urn out to· 
be. the cen.t.e·:r of'· the universe and it may be tJ1at man' s·.e,,-~· a,.,.,~,·.:· 
pe.r.ceptual o·r mental appa.ratus is adequate to _give him 
lmowledge about the world as it • (Ev<t~ri if: lS . we find that 
-~· 
~ fr it is" in many ways, depending upon how we ''Look"· at· it, 
Chapter I would suggest that this is a more appropriate . ' . 
answer, but even· ·that may have to be rejected for some 
21 b·a · 151 I 1 .,·P· · . .. 
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·· crucial reasons to be, somehow.~·22 fourid · 1n the· future·.) But 
~ , ' 
• a.gain, to suppose th~-t w~ could correctly decide· -without re-
~-
.. 
·search is to trust to chance, what is of tremendous signi-
·ficance, and. ·so· should be \nvestigated rather t,han stipulated 
as dogma. t 
' What I have said thus far with re_gards to observation 
' does ·_not concJ_usi vely est·ablish the claim which initiated 
t~is particulai discussion, but it···shoµld serve to weaken the 
tenacity with which somi clin~ t9 the alleged existence of 
a • 
,.-_pure observation. · And thus n.avtng raised, I .hope,/ some doubt:s 
along these lines I will now 
O 
turn to a more particula.r analysts. 
I -have -already presentedr1nuch evidence against t'he hotion 
o:f "pure observation", which in short· wa-:$ that. our observations 
are done by means of instruments and that t-hese instruments 
·were not given to us- by some omniscient. being~ complete wit_h_ 
·free installation ·a-n·d instruction bookl .. et; but were ;,devised 
and constructed o:r:iiy·- th!ough th·e use /of the:or·i·es. · Neverthe-
le_ss some, evi'dently do. bel,.i_e_ve i·n some such absurd notion 
Jrs_: the beneficient suppl·1¢r :f"or notwithstanding what has al-
·ready t>een said, they still put their faith in the, supremacy 
. 
,~-,---~- of· obs~rvat·ions .. o.ver theories, thu~- necessitating further 
. 
comments . 
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·The point upon· which· the present· argument wi·11 tum ·1s 
-:, . 
that the dichotomy between the observable and the theoretical 
is a·fiction, and a rnisleading_ohe at.that, as is .. evident 
. -
·b:y- the above. 
S,ince, in sp_ite of· the arguments given above, some would 
56 
s·till maintain t·he: special status of. observation, they cannot ~·· 9 
mean observations made with the use of instruments. They.· 
must have in mind some pristine form of observation. A brute 
·"look and ·see" typ=e. But then when I pu:t on my gl~ss.-e·s and-
:l--o-c,k am I no l_on-.g~r making a pure( ob.servations? And if th.is 
.· is allowed (as indeed it must be_.,, f,_or :_gl_a.s.ses are just ..
another lens used in conjunction. with. =th·e- 'eye), then· w:ha~-t 
about ... the use of a magni.f.ying: ,g:1as.s_, and .. then. t-he use of a 
low-powered microsq:ope, arid then ·t'.he \tse -o·f .a ;high-powered 
microscope, etc. 23 Once the fi:t$t step iS allowed, there is 
. . 
:n:o stopping and it leads irretrievabl·y .int·:o tbe theoretical 
·realm. Furthermore the first step is· perfe-.c~;~y 1·egit.imate 
and must be allowed. Th8f this is so may be seen by 
.f 
considering a si.mp.le ,case: My frtend (who does :not wear 
glasses) and I ·a,re: o.u.tdoors and he points to :a bir.d high i.rt 
< 
the sky. I', 'no·t weartng· ;my .gl:asse·s.,. b:11t n.eeding them, l·ook 
23Grover Maxwell. "The Ontological· S atus of Theoretical 
Entities," in Minnesota Stuqies in the Philosophy __ of . 
Science. Vol. III; Scientific Explanation, Space and Time, 
edited by Herbert Feigl and Grover Maxwell, Minheapolis, 
Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1962 . 
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. a~d see nothing ... Now, then, we have·, two· individuals making· 
"pure" observations, but ~ith· conflicting results. Of 
course the reply,;. would be ·that "looking and seeing" cons ti~ 
tutes a pu.re observation only when the observer has normal 
vision~ . And thi.s, ~s a good answ.er. But that is precisely 
... what glas.se.s are for -- to reinstate normal vision -- hence, ' 
,+.', .. 
the :f-irs_t, ste_p in the series. c_ann.ot be precluded and with· 
:t t c .. _om_e;_s all the other st e·ps . 
· . There a.re other ramif'tcattons of the problem· of / 
• 
.. ob·.s·ervat-:ian which cou·l.d :be. :ta.k.~-P up, such as whether we 
-even know what it is that we are observing (with or withou-t.: 
; 
:inst:ruments) without a theory of perception, but I thi.n:k 
t.h-e case that obse.r··vS.tions are theory-dependent ha-s bee.n 
·s:uf:fi.ci·ently maq~ for our purposes, and with .. it the 
·e,;,ctinguisrutng of the ,belie·r t:ha·t observation~ o.r fac.ts 
1 
' '. . '4 . ·. . . coul:d supply a firm and incor)'.9·tgi_ble fo.un-a.·at:ion. o;f· knowledge. 
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